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Abstract 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is formally named the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002. The act is arguably one of the most significant reforms 
to affect the U.S. stock markets since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This study 
compares valuation implications of ADR announcements before and after the 
introduction of the act. A total of 234 ADR announcements are analyzed over a time 
frame spanning from 1994 to 2010 by employing event study methodology. Even though 
several studies attempt to explore the effects of the act on the value of firms issuing 
American Depository Receipts (ADR), reported results are either negative or positive. 
The empirical results presented in this study indicate that the impact on ADR issuing 
firms is not negative. The observed cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) reveal that 
investors on average positively react to ADR issue announcements during the post 
Sarbanes-Oxley period.  However, empirical results do not lend support for the 
hypothesis that CARs are significantly different during the two periods analyzed in the 
study. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, many corporate scandals have adversely affected U.S. investors’ 
confidence in corporate governance practices of large firms. Due to these adverse 
consequences, U.S. investors saw a need for innovation that was to improve corporate 
governance practices of companies and enforce transparency in disclosing financial 
information to public. This would mainly come from the government through regulations.  
During the beginning of the millennium various  bills were passed to satisfy this 
requirement including a bill that was a reaction to major corporate accounting scandals, 
namely Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) also referred as the 'Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act' (in the Senate) and 'Corporate and 
Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act' (in the House ). Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
essentially a US - Federal Law that sets new standards or improves the existing standards 
for all U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms
1
.  
In a capitalist economy, policy makers must give careful consideration to all of their 
actions. Ideally, government regulations should help to restore corporate integrity and 
investor confidence without disturbing the corporate dynamism that underlies a strong 
economy. In practice, however, some government regulations do not achieve this 
objective as some regulations create controversies due to potential trade-offs between the 
costs and benefits. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be construed as such a controversial act.  
It is an important act that impacts all public firms listed on the U.S. stock markets.  
                                                          
1
 Thomas Clarke, 2007. 
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Various researchers have conducted studies to examine the SOX’s effects on public firms 
and most of them concentrated on U.S. firms that are listed in the U.S. stock markets. The 
results of these studies are varied: some find that the Act has a positive impact on the 
firm value
2
 while the others claim the act has a negative impact
3
.  Some other researchers 
who are interested in the effects of the Act on the cross-listed foreign firms or the ADR 
programs have also conducted studies, and reported varying results
4
.  
In general, there are two main reasons for researchers to pursue study of the ADR 
programs and the SOX’s effect on these programs: first, the ADR programs have an 
important role in the U.S. and the global equity markets; second, SOX is a critical act that 
affects all listed firms in the U.S. Since the corporate governance structure in the United 
States is a configuration of an Anglo-American system, which is also considered as an 
outsider system, listed firms’ behaviors are monitored in the equity markets through 
government regulations
5
.  Hence, firms are obligated to comply with set standards in 
order to display their commitment to good corporate governance structures to public. The 
importance of the ADR programs and special role of the SOX are elaborated below. 
In recent decades, foreign firms have increased their ADR programs significantly. This 
might suggest that foreign firms and U. S. investors have gained benefits from these 
programs. The diversity of these programs is also an important characteristic; the origins 
of foreign firms range from emerging market countries to developed countries. There is 
also substantial regional diversity and regional origin varies from Latin America to 
                                                          
2
 Berger et al. (2006); Lai (2003); Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008); Rezaee and Jain (2006).   
3
 Asthana et al. (2004); Block (2004); Eldridge and Kealey (2005); Kamar et al. (2005); Leuz et al. (2006); 
Zhang (2005) 
4
 Kate Litvak (2007a), Berger et al., (2006); Kamar et al., (2005); Smith,(2007) 
5
 Thomas Clarke, 2007 
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Australia. Currently, the ADR programs play a significant role in both U.S. stock markets 
and foreign stock markets: In 2010, the trading value and volume of the depository 
receipt (DR) programs worldwide reached $3.5 trillion and 147 billion DRs respectively.  
The NYSE and NASDAQ are the dominant markets that account for 89 percent of the 
trading value and 84 percent of the trading volume.
6
 The U.S. investors can conveniently 
invest in foreign companies in the U.S. equity markets through ADRs and therefore 
ADRs constitute an important link between the U.S. and the foreign equity markets. 
Primarily because of this linkage, researchers are interested in understanding the 
increasing importance of the ADR programs. Consequently, a number of studies have 
been conducted to explore the reasons behind the growth of the ADR programs and the 
potential benefits of these programs
7
. A widely reported result in these studies is that the 
ADR programs support a convenient way for the foreign firms to access to the U.S. stock 
markets where they can attain lower cost of capital, higher liquidity, and prestige
8
.     
The reason for enacting the SOX of 2002 is clear; the U.S. law makers want to restore 
investors’ confidence about the transparency of the U.S. stock market that was 
significantly eroded by the frauds committed by some well-known corporations in 2001 
and 2002. This act imposes significant changes in regulations that require public firms to 
increase the transparency of their financial statements and the responsibility of Board of 
directors.  
Many policy makers and researchers have debated about the benefits and costs of this act. 
The supporters argue that the act’s benefits are greater than the costs to the public firms 
                                                          
6
 BNY Mellon. The depositary receipt market. 2010 yearbook   
7
 Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Doukas and Switzer (2000), Salva (2003), Lee (1991), Varela and Lee 
(1993), and Lau et al. (1994). 
8
 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
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while the critics say that the act’s benefits are not worth the substantially higher 
compliance costs.  
In order to better understand the cost-benefit effects on firms, numerous studies have 
been conducted.  Some of these studies acknowledged the limitations due to deficiencies 
in the control groups.  For example, Berger et al. (2005)
9
 compare stock returns of the 
cross-listed firms and those of the U.S. public firms to find the effects of the act; the 
limitation of their method is the lack of a control group that was not affected by the act 
that could be compared with a group affected by the act.  
This study uses a control group to find SOX’s effect on the ADR programs; however, it 
utilizes a distinct control group than those of Smith (2007)
10
 and Litvak (2007b)
11
. Since 
the SOX was passed in July 30, 2002, the time line is divided into two periods: the pre-
SOX period and the post-SOX period. This division creates a natural point of 
comparison. The post-SOX period begins on July 30, 2002 when the SOX were enacted. 
In this period, the level-2 and level-3 cross-listed firms have to comply with the Act. The 
pre-SOX period spans the period before July 30, 2002; in this period, the level-2 and 
level-3 cross-listed firms were not subject to any such regulations. In contrast to Smith 
(2007) and Litvak (2007b), this study compares the valuation implications on the level-2 
and level-3 cross-listed firms in the post-SOX period with those in the pre-SOX period to 
explore the SOX’s effects.        
                                                          
9
 Berger et al. (2005) 
10
 Smith (2007) 
11
 Litvak (2007b) 
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This study considers the ADR issuing announcement date as an event date. Then, it 
measures the abnormal returns of the local stocks (listed already in the local market) of 
these foreign firms around the event dates to measure the SOX’s effects. 
When the foreign firms announce that they are going to issue the ADRs, the prices of 
their local stocks are theoretically impacted (either increase or decrease) by these 
announcements. In the context of the event study, the reaction of the home market 
investors (positive or negative) upon these announcements is the key determinant of the 
changes in the foreign firms’ value.  
The study aims to answer two research questions: First, does SOX impact the firm values 
of the ADR issuers? If SOX’s effects are significant, the study then goes on to explore 
whether these effects are positive or negative. As previously described, the reaction of the 
local investors to the announcement date determines the change in underlying stock and, 
as a result, changes in the firm value of the foreign firms. The difference between these 
changes in the pre-SOX period and the post-SOX period represents SOX’s effect on the 
ADR issuers. This study compares the stock returns of these two sub periods to conclude 
whether the SOX have an impact on the ADR issuers.     
Second, how do factors, such as firm size, country, and stock exchange, impact SOX’s 
effects on the ADRs?  Litvak (2007b)
12
 uses several independent variables (firm size, 
country, and stock exchange) to examine SOX’s effects on the ADRs, and this study also 
utilizes them to further explore the influence of SOX’s effects. 
                                                          
12
 Litvak (2007b) 
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This study contributes to the international business literature with two findings: SOX’s 
effects on the ADR issuers; and the correlation between certain factors and SOX’s 
effects. Even though previous studies have examined these issues, the contribution of this 
study is that it uses a new method, and extends the sample period.  
The results of this study may provide some insights to policy makers, managers, and 
investors. The policy makers may gain additional understanding of SOX’s effects on the 
ADR issuers. This understanding combined with other findings on how SOX affects U.S. 
public firms might help to understand SOX’s effect on the U.S. market as a whole. This 
recognition will help them to develop their policies. Managers might better understand 
SOX’s effects on their firms according to their firms’ characteristics (firm-size, country, 
and stock exchange), and then they might use this understanding to improve their 
strategies. Investors will also be able to gain insights on the impact of the regulation on 
their investments.        
The sample screening in this study included all level-2 and level-3 ADRs issued between 
1994 and 2010. Then, these ADRs were checked to see if their issuing announcement 
dates are available; the study only keeps those firms with confirmed announcement dates 
which resulted in 234 cases.   
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Chapter II focuses on the theoretical 
and empirical literature, Chapter III discusses the data and methodology, Chapter IV 
presents the empirical results, and Chapter V concludes the study with final remarks and 
discussion.  
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2. The American Depositary Receipt and The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
2.1. The American Depositary Receipt, a rising role 
This section describes the ADR’s characteristics and its role in the U.S. stock market in 
past decades.  
There are two ways the foreign firms can list in the U.S. stock market: direct listing or 
issuing ADRs. In direct listing, the foreign firms, like the U.S. firms, have to strictly 
comply with all regulations of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In issuing 
ADRs, they can have some leeway because the SEC favors to encourage them to list in 
the U.S. stock market. Since foreign firms may have difficulties in complying with the 
SEC’s regulations to list directly, they prefer issuing ADRs.  
In the early twentieth century, many foreign firms and investors used the Depositary 
Receipt (DR) programs to meet their global needs. In the beginning, there were only a 
few DR programs, but over the decades, these DR programs have gradually developed. 
As of 2010, there are over 3,500 DR programs originating a large cross-section of 
markets ranging from UK to Singapore.  These DR programs play an important role in 
the global financial markets
13
. 
There are several types of the DR programs: the American Depositary Receipts (ADR), 
the Global Depositary Receipts (GDR), the European Depositary Receipts (Euro DR). 
Their names signal the markets where they are listed and traded
14
.        
                                                          
13
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
14
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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The American Depositary Receipt programs comprise a majority of the DR programs. 
There are currently more than 2,500 ADR programs listed and traded in the U.S. equity 
markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, and OTC) and they account for 70 percent of all DR 
programs.  According to JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide
15
, the ADR programs 
account for 16 percent of the entire U.S. equity market.     
The ADRs are negotiable securities; they are traded, cleared, and settled like any other 
U.S. securities. Since they are dollar-denominated and they represent the ownership of 
the cross-listed firms’ securities 16 , they constitute an easy route for international 
diversification for US investors.  The ADRs also provide foreign firms to access to the 
world’s largest and most active capital markets.  
The historical development of the ADRs can be summarized in the following timeline
17
:   
In 1927, the first ADR program was established by JP Morgan. It was utilized by the 
U.K. based Selfridges Department Store in order to increase the efficiency of its foreign 
investment. However, the pace of ADR programs was slow during this period. 
In the 1950s, several large multinationals in Western Europe, Australia, and Japan began 
listing in the U.S. stock market. In the 1970s, dozens of ADR programs were developed 
for the mining industry. In the 1980s, the market experienced a tremendous growth, but 
there were still fewer than 200 ADR programs globally.   
In the 1990s, the SEC dealt with the dramatically increased demand of U.S. investors for 
ADRs, while foreign firms who wanted to list in the U.S. market in form of ADRs were 
                                                          
15
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
16
 JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide 
17
 JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide 
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disconcerted by the strict regulations of this market compared to those of the other 
foreign markets. In response, the SEC proposed several protocols to ease these 
regulations. These included allowing foreign firms a longer period of time before 
submitting their financial reports to the SEC and easing registration and filing 
requirements for foreign firms in tender, exchange, and right offers
18
. Meanwhile, the 
quick-paced development of privatizations, global offerings, and emerging markets 
brought high visibility to the ADR programs. 
In the 1990s, the world experienced the boom of technology and the acceleration of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) activities that led the ADR market ahead. 
The dramatic increase of the ADR programs in the 1990s shows that these programs 
satisfy the demand of both U.S. investors and foreign firms. Previously, U.S. investors 
had to deal with many difficulties when purchasing foreign firms’ stocks, and foreign 
firms also had to deal with many challenges if they wanted to list in the U.S. stock 
market. The ADR programs help both entities to overcome these difficulties. 
There are a number of ways for the U.S. investors to diversify internationally. First, they 
can buy shares from the U.S. global corporations like McDonalds, Microsoft, GE, Coca 
Cola, and Nike; 40% of the income of these companies comes from outside the U.S. 
Second, they can invest in mutual funds that possess global assets. They can also buy 
stocks of foreign index funds, and lastly, they can buy shares of non-U.S. companies 
from home countries or buy ADRs.
19
 
                                                          
18
 Harold Schimkat (1992) 
19
 JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide 
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If U.S. investors want to invest directly in the foreign markets by buying stocks of the 
non-U.S. firms, they will have to face many of the following difficulties  
The quotes and dividends of these stocks are in foreign currencies. It can be costly and 
inefficient to convert these currencies to the U.S. dollar constantly. Trading, clearing, and 
settlement in a foreign country are usually performed in the native language and 
supplemented by native customs. This makes these procedures unfamiliar and 
cumbersome for the U.S. investors. Trading costs and custodian charges are often much 
higher than those in the U.S. market. Dividend withholdings and other taxes are often 
weighty and expensive in foreign countries. Annual reports, proxies, and other corporate 
information may not be available in English
20
. 
For these and many other reasons, a lot of U.S. investors prefer to buy ADRs instead of 
stocks of non-U.S. firms from home countries. Buying ADRs also have the following 
benefits. 
 
2.1.1. Benefits to the foreign firms  
When foreign firms list their ADRs in the U.S. market, the market is expanded. Since the 
price of the underlying share is affected by the conditions of the local market and the U.S. 
market. Any large fluctuations in either market would be neutralized by the stability of 
the other market
21
.     
                                                          
20
 JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide 
21
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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When listing in the U.S. market, the name and image of the company is exposed to the 
foreign market. Foreign firms usually issue their ADRs in large capital markets that 
require the listed firms to comply with some strict regulations. Therefore, if the foreign 
firms are listed in these markets, their names and images are spread to the world market 
and investors have more faith in the quality of their corporate governance
22
.    
Companies that list in the U.S. market have more chances to raise capital. Foreign firms 
typically issue the ADRs in the largest and most active capital markets; this is a good 
opportunity for them to raise the capital. 
23
 
 
2.1.2. Benefits to the U.S. investors  
The U.S. investors face several challenges in international diversification of their 
portfolios. These challenges include: unreliable settlements, costly currency conversions, 
unreliable custody services, poor information flows, unfamiliar market practices, 
confusing tax conversion, and many others. By providing the following benefits, ADRs 
help the investors avoid these obstacles
24
. 
U.S. investors have to pay to convert the foreign currency to the U.S. dollar when they 
buy foreign stocks directly to diversify their portfolio. However, when quotations, 
payment of dividends, or interest of the ADRs are in U.S. dollars, this helps U.S. 
                                                          
22
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
23
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
24
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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investors save on costs because they don’t have to convert the foreign currency to the 
U.S. dollar
25
.  
Trade, clearance, and settlement procedures of the ADRs are like those of U.S. stocks, 
and since U.S. investors are familiar with them, this promotes confidence when they trade 
ADRs. 
Investors can convert DRs to the underlying shares directly upon cancelation, and this 
provides U.S. investors with greater opportunity to trade their ADRs. The more the 
opportunity to trade, the better the chance for greater profit and fewer losses; this is the 
advantage of ADRs that attract U.S. investors
26
.  
Generally, U.S. investors prefer investing in foreign firms when their investments are 
protected by U.S. securities regulations. The ADRs satisfy this requirement, because they 
represent the underlying foreign stocks and are listed in the U.S. stock market; therefore, 
the ADR is the preferred channel for U.S. investors.   
 
2.1.3. Types of the ADRs  
Depositary banks play an important role in creating and trading ADRs. They are the 
banks that support all services for the ADR programs. These services include arranging a 
custodian for the foreign firms’ stocks at the foreign stock market. This custodian is 
necessary for the depositary banks issuing the ADRs. After the ADRs are issued in the 
U.S. stock market, the depositary banks continue to maintain the information of the ADR 
                                                          
25
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
26
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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holders and play the agency role to distribute dividends to the ADRs holders in U.S. 
dollars
27
.       
Depending on the characteristics of the agreement signed between depositary banks and 
the foreign firms, there are two types of the ADRs: unsponsored and sponsored. While 
the former is issued by the depositary banks without a formal agreement, the latter is 
issued by the depositary banks appointed by the foreign firms under a formal agreement. 
This agreement specifies the responsibilities and benefits for both the foreign firms and 
the depositary banks and sets up the firms’ ability to raise capital by issuing the DR.  
 
2.1.3.a. Sponsored level-1 ADRs 
This is the simplest form of the ADR programs. The level–1 ADRs do not need full SEC 
registration. They also do not have to report their accounts to the U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) or provide full disclosure to the SEC. They only 
need to continue complying with the disclosure regulations of the home stock market. 
This means that when foreign firms issue sponsored level-1 ADRs, they can earn the 
benefits of a publicity- traded security in the U.S. market without having to change their 
current reporting process. Due to these benefits, the level-1 ADR programs are the 
fastest-growing of all ADR programs
28
. 
The level-1 ADR programs constitute the majority of the ADR programs, in which many 
well-known multinational-corporations have participated. The foreign firms that 
                                                          
27
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
28
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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participate in this program usually have between 5 and 15 percent of their shareholders in 
this ADR program. Many foreign firms use the level-1 programs as the first stepping 
stone to upgrade to the level-2 and level-3 ADRs. 
The limitation of the level-1 ADR programs is that the foreign firms in these programs do 
not have the right to raise capital in the U.S. stock market or to offer the DRs to the 
public and they are not listed on the U.S. stock exchanges. Nevertheless, they are allowed 
to list in the OTC markets and their prices are published in the Pink Sheets 
 
2.1.3.b. Sponsored level-2 and level-3 ADRs  
Foreign firms must register level-2 or level-3 ADRs in order to satisfy the requirements 
to list on the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) and raise capital. 
Level-2 and level-3 ADRs need to have SEC registration and must satisfy GAAP rules. 
While the firms with level-2 ADRs have the right to list on U.S. stock exchanges without 
raising capital privileges, firms with level-3 ADRs have both the privilege to list and to 
raise capital
29
. 
Both the level-2 and the level-3 ADRs use public offerings to issue their ADRs and are 
required to submit annual filings (20-F) with the SEC. U.S. exchanges also require the 
level-2 and the level-3 ADRs to meet some listing requirements, such as annual turnover, 
breadth of shareholder base, etc
30
.   
 
                                                          
29
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
30
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2.1.3.c. The level-4 ADRs 
Foreign firms can use restricted programs to ensure that their stock can only be traded by 
certain individuals. There are two restricted programs: Rule 144-A and Regulation S. The 
level-4 ADR programs issued under these two programs are the Rule 144-A ADRs and 
Regulation S ADRs.  
These programs raise capital through private placement, in which the Rule 144-A ADRs 
raise capital through large institutional investors or Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs), 
and the Regulation S ADRs raise capital through offshore or non-U.S. residents
31
.  
The level-4 ADRs are special programs that foreign firms can use to access U.S. stock 
markets without SEC registration. Due to these special characteristics, some foreign firms 
may find level-4 ADR programs attractive. Approximately 30% of all issued ADRs 
governed fall under one of these two rules
32
. 
The following sections feature some issues associated with the ADRs such as issuance, 
trading, termination, pricing, etc. 
 
2.1.4. Issuing ADRs   
There are two ways that U.S. investors can buy the ADRs. The first and most 
straightforward method is to buy existing ADRs in the U.S. stock market
33
.  This is a 
simple, secondary market transaction like any other. If there are no willing sellers of an 
                                                          
31
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
32
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
33
 Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
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outstanding ADR in the market, investors can acquire ADRs through their brokers.  In 
this case, an ADR is created in the market. The broker directly buys the foreign firms’ 
underlying stocks at the foreign market and sends them to a designated custodian in the 
foreign market. Afterwards, the custodian informs the depositary bank in the U.S. market 
about the transaction and the depositary bank issues the ADRs to the initiating broker. 
The number of the ADRs issued is specified by the custodian and is based on the number 
of the underlying stocks held in the custodian account in the foreign market.  Finally, 
these ADRs are delivered to the U.S. investors. The initiating brokers must convert the 
U.S. dollars paid by the U.S. investors into the corresponding local currency and pay the 
foreign brokers
34
. 
 
2.1.5. Trading ADRs 
After the ADRs are issued, they are traded in U.S. stock markets. If U.S. investors want 
to buy the ADRs, there are two ways to do it, and these were described in the previous 
section about the issuance of ADRs. U.S. investors can sell their ADRs either in the 
secondary market or cancel ADRs through their brokers by selling them back to the 
foreign market. In the ADR cancelation, the initiating brokers take the order and ask the 
foreign brokers to sell the underlying stocks that represent the number of ADRs. When 
these transactions are completed, the initiating brokers surrender the ADRs to the 
depository institutions and the depositary bank cancels the ADRs.  The depository bank 
also informs the custodian bank in the foreign market to deliver the underlying stock to 
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the foreign brokers to settle the transaction. In the end, the brokers arrange the conversion 
of the local currency to U.S. dollar and pay the U.S. investors
35
.       
 
2.1.6. ADR termination 
The termination of one ADR program cancels all ADRs of that program. As a result, this 
termination delists all ADRs from the stock market where they were traded. This 
termination is usually at the issuer’s request, but it also can be at the discretion of the 
depositary bank. The ADRs are terminated usually because the foreign issuers are 
reorganizing their firms or merging with other firms
36
. 
The ADR issuers must issue a notice in writing at least thirty days before the termination 
date. After this announcement date, the holders of these terminated ADRs can react in 
two ways: they can ask the depositary bank to surrender their ADRs and convert them 
into the home underlying stocks or they can continue to hold their ADRs. If they choose 
the sell their ADRs, the ADR holders must find the brokers in the home market where 
their underlying stocks are traded to continue transactions on their underlying stocks. If 
they choose to keep their ADRs, the depositary banks continue holding the ADRs and 
collecting dividends, but they cease distribution to the ADR holders. One year after the 
termination date, the depositary bank liquidates these ADRs and allocates the money to 
their ADR holders
37
. 
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2.1.7. Pricing ADRs  
The intra-market trading of an ADR is formed and operated efficiently when there is a 
large number ADRs in this market. If 3 percent to 6 percent of the ADR issuer’s share are 
in the form of ADRs, intra market trading may be feasible. Before this intra-market 
trading market is formed, most operations in this market include buying the underlying 
stocks in the foreign market and converting them into the ADRs; these operations are 
categorized as ADR issuance
38
. 
Brokers use intra-market trading to conduct transactions for their customers. There are 
three types of transaction that the brokers can use to satisfy their customers’ orders: (1) 
buying or selling existing ADRs, (2) surrendering the ADRs, and (3) issuing the new 
ADRs. The brokers choose among these three ways, seeking the best prices and the 
highest profits for their operations. For example, if brokers have an order to buy an ADR 
with a certain price set by the customer; they would proceed in one of two ways: buying 
the existing ADRs or buying the underlying stocks in the home market and then 
converting them into the new ADRs. Before they act, they must consider which way costs 
the least and brings them the highest profit. For example, if the brokers have an order to 
sell ADRs with a certain price from the customers, they would consider two ways to do: 
(1) selling them to the existing ADRs market or (2) surrendering the ADRs to the 
depositary bank and then selling the underlying stocks in the home market
39
. They will 
choose the way that brings them the highest profit. This continuous buying and selling of 
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the ADRs in either market helps minimize the ADRs’ price difference between the home 
and U.S. market.  
 
2.1.8. Equity Offerings  
Before the intra-market trading market is established, the ADR issuers can offer their first 
public ADRs. This provides a sufficient number of the ADRs to the market and forms a 
pool where investors can begin trading. During an ADR issue, the issuers (the foreign 
firms) deliver their underlying stocks to the custodian at the home market. Then the 
depositary bank in the U.S. market issues the corresponding ADRs based on the 
underlying stocks to be held by the custodian. Afterwards, the depositary bank sends 
these ADRs to the underwriting syndicate. At this point, a regular market can 
commence
40
. 
Overall, the ADR’s characteristics help U.S. investors easily buy the foreign stocks at 
U.S. stock markets and help the foreign firms to issue their stocks in U.S. markets 
without having to drop regulations that they have complied with in their home markets. 
Due to these convenient characteristics, the ADRs are established and have played an 
important role in U.S. equity markets.     
 
2.2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX)  
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This section explores the reasons why this law was enacted and illuminates the 
underlying principles concerning auditing, securities analysis and corporate governance. 
These requirements help U.S. public firms increase the transparency in their financial 
reports.   
This act was passed on July 30, 2002. Formally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is referred to as 
the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. The law’s 
informal name was given in honor of its sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and 
Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-OH)
41
. 
In 2001, many large corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Sunbeam, Tyco, and 
Parmalat collapsed under the pressure of financial information frauds. These collapses 
revealed the systemic weakness of the accounting regulations in the U.S. capital markets. 
The corporations used “creative” accounting schemes to hide liabilities and enhance 
income while the auditors compiled good recommendations for the corporation’s 
financial statement. As a result, the investors were at a disadvantage because the 
underlying operational conditions were concealed from financial reporting. These 
collapses not only resulted in huge devaluations of the assets of investors, they also 
eroded the investors’ confidence in U.S. stock markets. Consequently, the development 
of U.S. stock markets was badly affected. To restore investors’ confidence and prevent 
other disastrous occurrences, SOX was enacted. SOX establishes a controlling 
mechanism to separate the benefits for the auditors and the benefits for the corporations. 
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This method of prevention is believed to guarantee the independence of the auditors and 
increase the reliability of financial reports
42
.  
Another widely cited reason for the collapse is the overlap between investment banking 
and securities analysis in financial institutions. The investment banking division makes a 
lending decision after analyzing results produced by the securities analysis division. 
However, these two operate under one corporate umbrella. Therefore, if the later division 
leads the former division to make a wrong leading decision, a problem occurs. The SOX 
Act is designed to address this problem
43
.   
According to the Act, the remaining reason that contributed to the collapse was the 
responsibility of the firms’ managers. Before SOX was created, the SEC’s regulations did 
not impose a strict controlling mechanism that linked the managers’ responsibility with 
the financial statements’ transparency; SOX was designed to address this problem44.   
The Act is applicable to all public firms (both domestic and foreign) that have registered 
equity or debt securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Foreign accounting 
firms that conduct work for companies subject to the Act also must comply with the Act. 
Overall, the Act enhances financial standards in three areas: (1) the performance of the 
audit work, (2) securities analysis and (3) corporate governance. The details of these 
improvements are presented in the ensuing section
45
.   
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2.2.1. New requirements for auditors 
According to policy makers who designed and passed the SOX, the overlap in the 
operations between the firms and their auditors is one of the most important causes of the 
collapse of the U.S. stock market in the early years of the twenty-first century. The SOX 
Act points out that when an auditor works for a firm, they have a dependent relationship; 
this connection would then lead to biased financial recommendations written by the 
auditor if he or she is selected to examine the firms’ financial statements. The SOX Act 
prevents the auditors from providing bookkeeping services, financial information system 
design, appraisals, valuations, fairness opinions, actual services, management functions, 
human resources, brokers/dealers, investment banking, investment advisory, legal, and 
other services to clients. However, tax services are allowed. The SOX Act also bans the 
firms from hiring their auditors’ employees as CEO, CFO, CAO, or controller if they 
worked for the auditor during the one year period preceding the company’s last audit.      
Aside from regulating the relationship between the auditors and their clients, SOX also 
issues some regulations that control the auditing firms’ operations. In order to do this, 
SOX required the establishment of The Public Accounting Oversight Board (PAOB). 
This is a nonprofit corporation overseen by the SEC, which selects all five members of 
the PAOB. All auditing firms have to register with the PAOB, whose role is to register, 
regulate, inspect, investigate, and discipline public accounting firms
46
. 
Consequently, auditors are required to keep their notes, records, and work papers for 
every audit conducted for at least seven years after the work is performed. These records 
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need to include enough information to support the auditors’ decisions. These 
requirements collectively contributed to a surge in auditing costs
47
. 
The managers of the ADR issuing firms anticipate that the higher standards and costs of 
the auditing process would boost the firm value (because the investor would have more 
faith in the better quality of auditing) and thus compensate for the auditing cost
48
.  
 
2.2.2. New requirements for securities analysis 
Regarding conflicting interests in securities analysis, the SOX Act’s objective is to 
further separate the tacit cooperation between the investment banking and the securities 
analysis division of most financial-services institutions
49
. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
prevents members of a financial services institution’s investment banking division from 
supervising, approving compensation for or retaliating against members of the securities 
analysis division. The act also requires auditors to disclose all personal conflicting 
interests to clients, compelling them to reveal all compensations and business relating to 
clients
50
.  
This separation requires the securities analysis divisions to be more independent and 
careful in analyzing the financial situation of the firms and compiling a credible report for 
the investment banking divisions in order for the latter to make a reasonable lending 
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decision. This mission requires the securities analysis divisions to receive more pay from 
the ADR issuers. 
The higher the quality of the securities analysis service, the more confident the investors; 
the more trust the investors place in the firm, the better the firm’s value. This study 
examines this argument carefully. 
 
2.2.3. New requirements for corporate governance 
The Act requires the ADR issuers’ managers and officials to know the firms’ financial 
situation to increase their responsibility and limit criminal actions. In order to do this, the 
Act requires ADR issuers to form their own auditing committees; these committees 
consult with the ADR issuers’ managers about the firms’ auditing and financial situation. 
They have some rights including appointing, inspecting, regulating, and controlling the 
auditors’ operations; the auditors, in turn, have to report their operations directly to these 
committees. In order to warrant the independence and professionalism of these 
committees, the Act requires that the committees’ members should not be the ADR 
issuers’ employees, and the firms have to disclosure these members’ qualifications to 
ensure they are “financial experts”. The committees also have some other responsibilities 
in preparing and addressing complaints and confidential or anonymous submissions about 
the firm’s financial situation to the managers51. 
In order to increase the responsibility of the firms’ managers, the act also assigns some 
details that the firms’ managers should pay attention to and some penalties that would be 
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imposed if they violate the regulations. The Act requires the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Chief Financial Official (CFO) to certify in writing that the disclosure of the 
firms’ financial statements complies with the act. This certification prevents these 
officers from issuing misleading financial statements in order to obtain personal benefits. 
The act stipulates that the firms’ officers who use their power to manipulate or pressure 
the auditors into signing off misleading financial statements would be committing federal 
crimes. Additionally, the act specifies that if the firms that made misleading financial 
statements are exposed, these firms must redo those statements and their CEO and CFO 
have to return the bonuses, compensations and profits made by personal trades of the 
firm’s securities during the year after the faulty documents were initially disclosed52. 
In terms of limiting deception in compensating the firms’ officers, the Act states the 
following rules: most kinds of loans are banned to the firms’ directors and officers and 
the firms’ CEO and CFO are prohibited from selling their securities during the period 
when the firms’ other employees and retirement-plan participants cannot. In addition, the 
act also rules that if there is any change in the ownership that accounts for 10 percent or 
more of the firms’ securities, the owner of these trading securities has to inform to public 
within two business days
53
. 
The act also encourages the firms’ employees to uncover and correct any problem in the 
firms’ financial statements. The logic behind this rule is that the firms’ insiders or 
employees are in a unique position to discover of internal corruption; in order to protect 
the insiders, the act establishes rules that extend whistleblower protection to employees. 
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The act also rules that if a firm’s lawyers discover the firms’ violation of the SOX Act, 
they should report it to the firms’ chief counsel or CEO, or anyone higher up on the chain 
of command or to the board of directors if no appropriate response is given
54
.   
The act creates a strict mechanism that increases the efficiency of the auditing, increases 
the trustfulness in the securities analyses and improves the corporate governance of the 
U.S. firms and intends to restore confidence of US investors
55
. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Direct cost, indirect cost, and benefit implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
the listing firms 
To fulfill the designated objectives, the act’s issuance helps increase the U.S. public 
firms’ benefits by improving auditing systems, enhancing managers’ responsibilities and 
improving securities analyses; however, the act’s compliance cost is the firms’ burden. 
This section explains the act’s benefits and compliance costs and helps readers gain a 
clearer understanding of the relationship between the act’s benefits and its compliance 
costs.         
 
3.1.1. Direct and indirect costs of the SOX 
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The SOX Act imposes some new regulations regarding auditing, lending and corporate 
governance on the listing firms. These regulations require these firms to pay to comply 
with this act. Many studies found that there are two types of compliance costs: direct and 
indirect. The former are the additional expenses the firms have to pay for auditing and 
managerial costs; the latter are the expenses that the firms do not have to spend but which 
can indirectly impact the firms’ operations. 
 
3.1.1.a. Direct costs 
Most of the studies on direct cost focus on the auditing costs; these are theoretically the 
most expensive of the compliance costs. All regulations on auditing that the firms have to 
comply with are presented in section 404 of the act. 
Asthana, Balsam, and Kim (2004)
56
 find out that the ratio of auditing fees to assets 
increased in the year 2000 and 2002. Supporting this result, Eldirdge and Kealey (2005)
57
 
examined the costs of the internal control from a sample of Fortune 1,000 companies and 
revealed that the average auditing fees increased to $2.3 million from 2003 to 2004 alone. 
In terms of the relationship between the firm size and the auditing cost of the listing 
firms, one study published in Financial Executives International (2005)
58
 uses the 
differences in firm sizes to examine the compliance costs in section 404 of the act. The 
study reports that the large firms (market capitalization above $700 million) that comply 
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with section 404 spend an average of $4.3 million, while the small firms (market 
capitalization below $700 million) spend an average of $1 million.  
Koehn & Del Vecchio (2004)
59
 find an interesting statistic regarding the cumulative 
compliance costs of all public firms, which amounts to approximately $7 billion, or 1% 
of their combined revenue. 
Hartman (2007)
60
 discovers that the auditing fees in the period from 2001 to 2006 
increased 189% for the S&P 500 firms, 251% for the S&P mid-cap firms and 311% for 
the S&P small-cap firms. Furthermore, Hartman (2007) also indicates that auditing costs 
vary across firms.        
The results of the studies cited above show that the firms’ auditing fees have significantly 
increased since SOX was enacted. These studies also show that the auditing fees vary 
depending on the firm size
61
.  
 
3.1.1.b. Indirect costs 
A few studies focus on indirect cost, which is divided into three types: (1) lost investment 
opportunities, (2) opportunity costs and (3) excessive staff burdens. These types of costs 
along with direct cost are described as factors that can negatively impact U.S. stock 
markets, U.S. investors and listing firms’ operations.   
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Engel, Hayers, and Wang (2006)
62
 find that the number of firms who were going private 
modestly increased after SOX’s enactment. Supporting this conclusion, Carney (2007)63 
discovers that the firms who file the Schedule 13E-1 complain that one of the most 
important reasons why they decide to go dark is the high compliance costs of SOX. These 
studies suggest that the action of delisting, or not listing, on U.S. stock exchanges for 
some large-sized domestic firms shows that these firms and U.S. investors are losing their 
investment opportunities because they miss the chance to use the stock exchange to 
mobilize capital and “bond” their image. These firms then decide to go dark or list on 
foreign stock exchanges such as the London stock exchange; some other firms also 
decide to list in other foreign stock exchanges. 
The executive officials, staffers, accounting department and some other departments of 
firms have to spend more time and resources in order to comply with the requirements of 
the SOX Act. Consequently, this inevitably reduces their capability to handle other 
missions, increases opportunity costs and increases the staffers’ burdens. A survey of the 
CFO Magazine (2003)
64
 finds that 33% of those surveyed have delayed or canceled 
several strategic projects due to SOX. This survey also finds that the executive officials 
have to spend 10% of their time on internal control assessment and certifying the firm’s 
financial reporting.     
 
3.1.2. Benefits of SOX 
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SOX is described as a controversial act. Along with the compliance costs previously 
mentioned, many benefits of the act were also discovered and analyzed. These benefits 
are:  improving the reliability of financial reporting, enhancing the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and increasing the liquidity of firms. 
Li, Pincus, and Rego (2004)
65
 and Jain and Rezaee (2006)
66
 find that the SOX Act plays 
an important role in restoring customer confidence, the integrity of the stock exchanges 
and the participants’ willingness to trade after assessing the firm’s published financial 
information. 
Governance Metrics International (2005)
67
, in a study composed of 2,500 international 
firms, found that the act led to a 10% improvement in the corporate governance of U.S. 
firms in comparison to their foreign partners’.  
Shadab (2007)
68
 demonstrates that the act has an important role in persuading firms to 
focus more on internal financial control. The study also shows that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act enhances the turnover and the responsibility of the boards of directors and reinforces 
the firms’ compliance with regulations.  
In terms of SOX’s role of limiting, controlling and eliminating financial statement fraud, 
some scholars try to measure the incidence of fraud before and after the enactment of 
SOX. These findings show that SOX has a positive effect on fraud reduction. Prentice 
(2007)
69
 shows that not one outrageous fraud in financial statements has been discovered 
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since SOX was passed. Cornerstone Research (2007)
70
 also confirms that the incidence of 
fraud has declined since SOX was passed. 
An additional benefit of SOX was discovered in a survey conducted by Price Waterhouse 
Coopers' (2005)
71
.  This study finds that private firms are also impacted by SOX even 
though, according to the SEC, they are not subject to the act. These private firms absorb 
some positive aspects from SOX’s regulations and change their corporate governance. 
The study shows that SOX has positive effects on the private and non-profit firms and 
reports that 30 percent of the firms in the survey replied that they are impacted or would 
be impacted in the near future by the act. This survey reveals that there are two 
motivations for private firms to willingly comply with SOX’s provisions: they want ex-
ante preventative maintenance rather than ex-post problem solving and the private firms 
want to adopt them to become the best-in-business practice.  The survey concludes that 
the private firms want to adopt SOX’s provisions because they want to avoid fraud and 
financial difficulties when they follow operational and controlling efficiencies. Most of 
the private firms in this survey perceive that they need to improve documentation and 
testing, strengthen corporate governance and reinforce ethics.    
Liquidity is another positive effect of SOX discovered by Bushee and Leuz (2005)
72
; this 
study reports that enhanced mandatory disclosure helps the firms improve market 
liquidity by reducing informational asymmetry.  
Generally, the results of these studies show that the compliance to the requirements of the 
act helps increase the U.S. public firms’ value by improving their corporate governance, 
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but the act’s compliance costs and several other indirect costs spark controversial debate 
about whether the act has a positive impact on the ADRs’ firm value. 
 
3.2. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on cross-listed firms 
This section describes some important provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: first, the kinds of 
ADRs that are subject to the act and the reasons why these ADRs are chosen to be subject 
to the act; second, two contrasting arguments about SOX’s effect on U.S. public firms; 
third, two methods (quantity and quality) to study SOX’s effects on U.S. public firms and 
the studies’ results that use these two methods; and fourth, some studies that examine 
SOX’s effects on the ADR issuers. The methods used in the studies about the SOX’s 
effects on U.S. public firms vary, as do the results.          
 
3.2.1. The level-2 ADRs and level-3 ADRs are subject to the Act but the level-1 
ADRs and level-4 ADRs are exempt:  
The SEC implementation of the Act relating to the ADRs is based upon their liquidity 
and firm-size. The level-1 and level-4 ADRs have low liquidity and small firm-size; 
therefore, the SEC categorizes them as an exception; since the level-2 and the level-3 
have high liquidity and large firm-size, the SEC categorizes them as being subject to the 
act. 
Before SOX was enacted, there were discussions among U.S. law makers regarding this 
act and the cross-listed firms. Some asserted that the cross-listed firms are not the cause 
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of the U.S. stock markets’ problems; therefore, the act should not apply to them. Others 
stated that they want to build a universal condition that applies to all firms in the stock 
market; therefore, the act should apply to the cross-listed firms. According to Senator 
Michael Enzi on this matter, “we need to be clear with respect to the area of foreign 
issuers and their coverage under the bill’s broad definition… Foreign issuers are not part 
of the current problems being seen in the U.S. capital markets, and I do not believe it was 
the intent of the conferees to export US standards, disregarding the sovereignty of other 
countries as well as their regulators.”73 
According to the spirit of the act, the SEC wants all the public firms to comply with all 
requirements on disclosure in financial reporting and enhance the responsibility of the 
corporate managers. The SEC also wants to eliminate all mistakes that happened before 
because of fraud in financial statements and create a new era of corporate governance 
where the investors can wholeheartedly believe in the reliability of financial reporting 
and the responsibility of corporate managers. The SEC hopes that a “global village” of 
modern business would be set up after the act is implemented74. 
However, there is an exception for level-1 ADRs and level-4 ADRs. As described earlier, 
according to the SEC’s regulations, level-1 ADRs and level-4 ADRs do not need to fully 
register and comply with all the disclosure requirements of the SEC while the Level-2 
and Level-3 ADRs need to fully register and comply with all the disclosure requirements 
of the SEC. Following this regulation, the SEC requires the level-2 level-3 ADRs to 
comply with the SOX’s regulations immediately while the level-1 and level-4 ADRs are 
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given a certain grace period to comply with these regulations. The small firm-size and 
low liquidity of the level-1 and level-4 ADRs are major reasons why the SEC sets them 
apart as an exception
75
.  
In summary, the level-2 and level-3 ADRs have to comply with the Act immediately 
while the level-1 and level-4 ADRs are given a certain time before they must comply 
with it.  
 
3.2.2. Two contrasting views about the SOX’s effects on the public firms   
The act brings benefits to the U.S. public firms, but it also adds compliance costs to these 
firms. Due to these two opposing effects, there are two contrasting views about SOX’s 
effect: the act may increase or decrease the value at any given U.S. public firm.      
Proponents argue that the act intensifies disclosure, enhances transparency in the firms’ 
accounting and auditing and increases the responsibility of the firms’ officials, actions 
that enhance the firms’ operational efficiency and firm value. In contrast, opponents state 
that the act increases the firms’ costs and decreases the firm value. This latter view 
asserts that adjustments to the firms’ accounting system and auditing work should be 
placed in the hands of market forces76. This argument points out further that market 
forces (or the market mechanism) should play a major role in adjusting firms’ accounting 
system and auditing work. The government’s attempts to interfere by issuing rules can 
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increase the firm’s compliance costs and decrease the firm’s value77. The implementation 
of the act by adjusting auditing work and increasing corporate governance, according to 
the spirit of this argument, are negative actions by the government that impose more 
compliance costs on firms and consequently decrease the firms’ value.   
Mitchell (2003)
78
, a supporter of the SOX, argues that the act brings benefits to the 
business community in several ways. Mitchell (2003) argues that the act brings the 
gatekeepers (auditors, lawyers, and analysts) into the realm of internal governance. These 
positions play an important role as watchdogs to ensure transparency for the firm’s 
financial system. Second, the act also enhances the responsibility of the CEO and of the 
audit committee; they are asked to be comprehensive about the firm’s financial situation 
and aware of the penalty should they violate the act. Finally, the act limits and separates 
conflicting-interest transactions. Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reestablishes the 
investors’ confidence and increases the shareholders’ value.  
In contrast, Romano (2005)
79
 and Butler and Ribstein (2006)
80
 argue that adjustment of 
the quality of corporate governance should depend on market forces. According to their 
view, the act only increases the bureaucratic burden and costs for the firm. They assert 
that well-governed firms already have reliable financial reporting systems, qualified 
officers and independent auditors. Therefore the act does not offer much help in 
improving the management quality of these firms. In actuality, it increases their cost 
burden if they want to comply with the requirements.    
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However, for those firms with high growth and low disclosure standards which invariably 
need more external capital to fuel their development, the act is helpful. Doidge at al. 
(2004a)
81
 argue that the act helps these firms improve the quality of their financial 
statements, enhance the officers’ responsibility, develop transparency in the auditing 
operations, and build up the firms’ credit. As a result, the firms will have more chances to 
mobilize external capital and grow. Thus, these kinds of firms would have benefits that 
outweigh the costs that they will have to pay for complying with the act’s requirements. 
Overall, SOX’s issuance triggered a controversial debate about its effects on the value of 
U.S. public firms: some argue that SOX increases firm value while others forward a 
counter argument amounting to value destruction.       
 
3.2.3. Two ways to measure the SOX’s effects  
There are many studies about SOX’s effects on the ADRs, using a number of different 
methods to measure these effects. Karolyi (2009)
82
 summaries these methods into two 
groups: (1) quantitative methods and (2) qualitative methods. The former includes studies 
that measure the number of the firms that relisted from U.S. stock markets after SOX’s 
enactment. According to these studies, the number of these relisting firms shows SOX’s 
negative effects on the listed firms; the higher the number of the relisting firms after 
SOX’s enactment, the more pronounced are SOX’s negative effects on the listed firms. 
The latter includes other studies that measure SOX’s effects on firm value. These studies 
use the event-study method to measure the stock return of the listed firm around the event 
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dates of SOX’s enactment; these event dates include some important dates in which the 
U.S. Congress organized some events to discuss, vote, and pass the act. These studies 
argue that the higher the positive or negative stock returns of the listed firms around the 
event dates, the greater the positive or negative effects, respectively, of the SOX Act. 
 
3.2.3.a. The results of the studies that use the quantitative method to study SOX’s 
effects on the cross-listed firms  
The results of these studies are mixed. Some claim that the act has a negative impact on 
the listed firms of the cross-listed firms; they demonstrate that the number of delisting 
cross-listed firms has been increasing since SOX’s enactment. Others disagree with this 
conclusion. They find that the act does not have a negative impact on the number of 
domestic and foreign firms that list on U.S. stock markets. They argue that the decrease 
in the number of the cross-listed firms in the U.S. market after SOX’s enactment is a 
common phenomenon in the world stock markets
83
.    
A few studies use the London stock market as a potential alternative to U.S. stock 
markets
84. These studies argue that after SOX’s enactment, foreign firms could consider 
the benefits and the compliance costs of SOX in order to decide if they should continue 
listing on U.S. stock markets or delist and then list in another stock market such as the 
London stock market. These studies also use this argument for the potential foreign firms 
that desire and plan to list on U.S. stock markets. They also consider the benefits and 
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compliance costs of SOX in order to decide if they are going to list on U.S stock markets 
or the London stock market.  
Supporting these studies (quantitative method), the researchers calculate the number of 
cross-listed firms that delist and the number of the cross-listed firms that begin listing in 
both markets (U.S. stock market and the London stock market) in two separate periods 
(the pre-SOX and the post-SOX). They argue that the increase or decrease in the number 
of the delisted firms on U.S. stock markets after SOX’s enactment and the increase or 
decrease in the number of the cross-listed firms that begin listing on the London stock 
market show that SOX has a negative or positive effect on the ADRs; the logic being that 
if SOX has a negative effect on the ADRs, the cross-listed firms delist from U.S. stock 
market and then list on the London stock market, and vice versa. 
These studies also use two time periods (the pre-SOX and the post-SOX) in their 
comparison. The argument is that the higher number of the delisted firms in the post-
SOX period compared to that in the pre-SOX period should show that SOX’s negative 
effects are worse in the post-SOX period, and vice versa
85
.      
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2008a)
86
 advocate SOX’s positive effects on cross-listed 
firms. They find that the number of cross-listed firms in both the U.S. stock market and 
the London stock market have been declining in their study period (after the SOX’s 
enactment), but they demonstrate that the decline is due to the change in firm 
characteristics rather than benefits of cross-listings. This study also verifies that the 
decline of ADRs on the U. S. stock exchanges is not related to SOX and confirms that 
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cross-listings on U.S. stock market have unique governance benefits for the foreign 
issuers. These benefits cannot be affected by SOX’s compliance costs or terminated when 
the firms cross-list on the London Stock Exchange. 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008)
87
 support the conclusions of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz; 
the study finds that SOX does not impact the change in number of cross-listed firms in 
U.S. stock markets and the London stock market. However, this study presents a new 
discovery in the relationship between SOX’s effects and firm-size of the cross-listed 
firms; the study finds that large foreign firms have the same benchmarks for choosing 
between U.S. stock exchanges and the London stock market after the act’s passage. This 
study shows, moreover, that small foreign firms are likely to choose the London Stock 
Exchange instead of NASDAQ. This is because small foreign firms are not as capable of 
absorbing SOX’s compliance costs as are large foreign firms that can absorb SOX’s 
compliance costs and then distribute them into many products that help reduce the ratio 
of SOX’s compliance costs to each of the firms’ products.     
In contrast to the two studies just described above, Hostak et al. (2007)
88
 provide 
evidence of the SOX’s negative effects on the delisting of the ADRs. The study finds that 
SOX’s passage coincides with an increase in the delisting of ADRs on the U.S. stock 
market. The result demonstrates that there are two motivations that led to the delisting of 
ADRs after the SOX Act: compliance costs and agency costs.    
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Duarte et al. (2007)
89
 show some interesting results in their study. One result supports the 
SOX’s negative effects but another supports the SOX’s positive effects. The former 
emphasizes that SOX has negative effects on the capability of foreign firms to list in the 
U.S.; the study shows that the probability of foreign firms listing in the U.S. is reduced 
because of SOX’s passage. The latter finds that SOX has positive effects on firm value; 
the study shows that firm value increased after SOX was implemented. This study also 
discovers some results linked to SOX’s effects on managers and minority investors. The 
study shows that SOX increases the opportunity cost of the managers and enhances 
benefits for minority investors. The study explains that since SOX’s passage, managers 
have to work harder than before in order to fulfill SOX’s requirements. As a result, this 
takes more of the managers’ time away from more productive activities. The study argues 
that if the managers reserve more time for SOX’s fulfillment, they have less time for the 
firms’ other jobs; this is an opportunity cost the firms have to pay to comply with SOX. 
Regarding the argument that SOX’s passage increases the benefits of minority investors, 
the study explains that SOX’s regulations guarantee the transparency of a firm’s financial 
situation, which helps minority investors avoid fraud usually conducted by majority 
investors. This benefits the minority investors.        
Marosi and Massoud (2008)
90
 look for the reasons why the cross-listed firms want to go 
“dark” (delisting), and what the characteristics are of these firms and the consequences on 
their stock price fluctuations and shareholder values. The study provides evidence 
supporting negative effects of SOX and concludes that SOX or auditing fees are a driving 
force behind the going-dark phenomenon.       
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Overall, the results of the studies that use the quantity method to study SOX’s effects are 
mixed. Supporters of SOX’s positive effects argue that the delisting of the ADRs in U.S. 
stock markets after SOX’s issuance is due to firm characteristics and is a common 
phenomenon of world markets; supporters of SOX’s negative effects argue that the 
delisting of the ADRs in the U.S. stock market after SOX’s issuance is caused by SOX’s 
high compliance costs. 
 
3.2.3.b. The results of the studies that use the qualitative method to study the SOX’s 
effects on the cross-listed firms 
The studies using this method utilize firm value to measure SOX’s effects on the ADR 
issuers. These studies are grouped into two types: (1) studies focused on U.S. public 
firms on U.S. stock exchanges91 and (2) studies that focused on cross-listed firms on U.S. 
stock markets92.  The results of these studies are mixed since they focus on either U.S. 
public firms or on cross-listed firms. 
 
3.2.4. The results of the studies that focus on the SOX’s effects on the U.S. public 
firms 
U.S. public firms are U.S.-based firms that list on U.S. markets. These firms are major 
subjects of the SOX Act. The results of the studies that focus on the SOX’s effects on 
these firms are mixed.    
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Almost all of the studies that measure SOX’s effects on U.S. public firms find that the act 
has negative effects on firm value. Zhang (2007)
93
 discovers that the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the event date of the firms that are subject to the SOX Act turns 
out negative after the act was implemented. One of the most critical discoveries of this 
study is that the act is responsible for the loss of around $1.4 trillion in value for U.S. 
public firms that list on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ around the event dates when the 
act was implemented. Zhang concludes that the results of the study confirm the 
shareholders’ hypothesis that both the restriction of non-audit services and the provisions 
to enhance corporate governance are costly to business.  
Rezaee and Jaim (2006)
94
 also use a sample of almost all of the U.S. public firms that list 
on U.S. stock markets to analyze the act’s effects on abnormal returns. They use the S&P 
500 Index and Value-Line Index to represent the entire market. Several leading events 
that represent the probability of SOX’s passage are chosen as the event dates. In contrast 
to Zhang’s results, this study discovers that the act is wealth-increasing on average and 
that the market reaction is more positive for the more compliant firms with effective 
corporate governance, reliable financial reporting and credible audit functions before the 
act was passed. To explain this result, the author cites the investors’ opinion that the 
firms in possession of a well-run corporate governance, good transparency in financial 
reporting and credible auditing functions do not have to spend a lot of money to comply 
with the act, while the firms with bad corporate governance, little transparency, and 
unreliable auditing functions have to suffer high costs in order to comply. Generally, the 
study concludes that there are many more induced benefits of the act than the imposed 
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compliance costs because investors believe that the act helps improve corporate 
governance and increase shareholder value.   
Li, Pincus and Rego (2008)
95
 also use a large sample of firms in U.S. stock markets 
where their names are listed in S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600; like 
Rezaee and Jaim’s results, Li, Pincus and Rego’s results show that the act’s legislative 
events have positive impacts on abnormal returns and firm value. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)
96
 also employ the firms that list on U.S. stock 
markets along with several legislative events of the act to measure the fluctuations of 
abnormal returns. However, the results of this study are different from the conclusions of 
Zhang, Rezaee and Jaim, Li and Pincus, and Rego. While Zhang concludes that the act 
generally has negative impacts on the firm value, Rezaee and Jaim, Li and Pincus, and 
Rego argue that the act generally has positive effects on the firm value. This study 
concludes that the act significantly impacts the firm value. It also argues that the firms 
that are more compliant with the law would earn negative abnormal returns, while the 
firms that are less compliant would earn positive abnormal returns from the act’s 
legislative events. 
The studies described above show puzzling results. These studies focus on the same 
firms, U.S. public firms, but the results about SOX’s effects on these firms are 
conflicting; furthermore, even though these studies concentrate on firms that have the 
same characteristics of corporate governance (transparency and the auditing system), the 
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results are still contradicting. These contrasting results show that the act is truly 
controversial.   
Recently, Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009)
97
 (henceforth, HSVJ) use 
an interesting method to measure the act’s effects on firm value. They observe lobbying 
activity of the firms on U.S. stock markets that opposed the act’s passage is an indicator 
of the firms that will be subject to the act. The authors hypothesize that the firms who 
sent lobbying letters to the SEC would be subject to the act. They group these firms in the 
observed set while the other firms that do not send lobbying letters to the SEC form the 
control set. The result of this study supports the benefits of the act. The authors find that 
the lobbying firms are those who have more and larger profitability, lower future growth 
opportunity, retain more cash, have agency problems, and are supposedly subject to the 
act. Interestingly and surprisingly, according to the findings of the study, the firms that 
lobby to block the law have higher cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
legislative event dates compared to the firms who choose not to lobby.  
 
3.2.5. The results of the studies that focus on the SOX’s effects on the cross-listed 
firms                 
There are a few studies regarding SOX’s effects on the cross-listed firms. These studies 
show that SOX causes a negative effect on the cross-listed firms and the impact varies 
depending on the cross-listed firms’ specific characteristics, such as the legal norms and 
disclosure standards of the home country, firm size, and level of corporate governance.  
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Berger et al. (2006)
98
 finds that SOX not only helps increase the cross-listed firms’ legal 
bonding benefits but also causes an increase in these firms’ compliance costs (such as 
audit fees); in general, the study discovers that SOX causes the cross-listed firms to incur 
negative price reactions because the increased compliance costs exceed the legal bonding 
benefits. The study also finds that SOX brings benefits to the cross-listed firms that have 
a home country with high judicial efficiency, weak private enforcement and weak 
minority-shareholder protection because SOX helps these countries extend their 
commitment to following higher standards. Finally, the study finds that the portfolios of 
U.S. public firms have higher negative price reactions than that of the cross-listed firms.       
Kate Litvak (2007a)
99
, a proponent of the second research direction, finds that the cross-
listed firms with high disclosure standards from developed countries suffered the 
strongest reduction in stock price after the act was passed. In contrast, the cross-listed 
firms that have lower disclosure standards from developing countries experienced a lower 
decline in their stock prices. This evidence is consistent with the view of investors that 
the act had a negative impact on cross-listed firms. The firms that have high disclosure 
standards and low growth suffer larger net costs, while the firms that have lower 
disclosure standards and higher growth experience lower net costs.   
Litvak (2007b)
100
 uses Tobin’s q and market/book ratios to estimate the effect of SOX on 
the cross-listing premium and comes up with the same results as her previous work. This 
study finds that Tobin’s q and market/book ratios of the cross-listed firms subject to the 
act reduced significantly in comparison with those of the firms that are not subject to it. 
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Another finding reported in the study indicates that the firms with high profitability, 
higher risk, smaller size, and better governance suffer the biggest losses as a result of 
SOX’s effects. The study confirms the investors’ expectations that the act has negative 
effects on the cross-listed firms on average, especially for the smaller and the already 
well-governed firms.     
Li Xi (2007)
101
 finds that the abnormal returns of the cross-listed firms have an average 
of -10% before and after the event dates that implement the act, while the others that list 
on the Pink Sheets and are not subject to the law do not show the effect of the act. Most 
of the cases involve negative returns for the well-governed firms. Li Xi also finds that the 
quantity of cross-listed firms that “go dark” in the post-SOX period is larger than that in 
the pre-SOX period. These firms would like to delist and deregister to avoid the “bad” 
regulations of the act. Li Xi discovers that the abnormal returns of delisting and 
deregistering are negative in the pre-SOX period but turn out positive in the post-SOX 
period. The conclusion of this study is that SOX brings excessive compliance costs to the 
cross-listed firms.                
In conclusion, these studies find that in the case of the cross-listed firms, the well-
governed firms and the small firms suffer the worst of SOX’s negative effects, while the 
badly-governed firms and the large firms suffer less of SOX’s negative effects. The 
explanation for this finding is that the well-governed firms already have good corporate 
governance in terms of auditing systems, transparency and management; therefore, these 
firms should not have to pay (SOX’s compliance costs) to build a new system of 
corporate governance to comply with SOX requirements. Nevertheless, in reality, these 
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well-governed firms still have to pay SOX’s compliance costs; therefore, according to the 
investors’ view, this cost is unnecessary, increases costs for the firms, negatively impacts 
the firms’ bottom lines, and, consequently, reduces firm value. In the case of small firms, 
since the operational size is small, compliance cost cannot be diffused across the firms’ 
products or operations. As a result, as the costs per product increases, there seems to be 
negative impact or reduction in firm value.     
As described, the study aims to capture SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers. SOX’s effects 
and characteristics were discussed in the above sections; for further exploration, factors 
that boost the firm value of the ADR issuers as described by the study are discussed in 
the following section. The following section complements the discussion of SOX’s 
related parts and intends to clarify how SOX’s regulations might impact ADR issuers.  
 
3.3. Factors that boost the value of the ADR issuers 
In the finance literature, the results reported in studies focusing on the market reactions to 
cross-listings have been mixed. In the early 1990s, some studies found that the market 
barely reacts to cross-listings102. These studies focus on London, Tokyo, Toronto, and 
Continental Europe. In the late 1990s and more recently, studies on the subject report that 
market reactions to cross-listings are significant when the listing takes place in Anglo-
Saxon stock exchanges103.   
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The majority of the empirical studies on international listings focus on the share price 
reactions around a firm’s cross-listing decision. They use the event study methodology to 
carry out these studies; the event date is chosen as the date related to the firm’s cross-
listing decision and the abnormal returns associated with the underlying stocks around the 
event date are measured to find if the cross-listing positively or negatively impacts the 
firm values. 
The length of the event window and return frequency employed in these studies vary; 
some use event-studies with monthly and weekly returns and a two-year event window, 
while others use daily returns and two or three month event windows.  
Description of the event date also differs across studies. While some studies focus on 
listing dates as event dates, others use exchange-application, application-acceptance, or 
regulatory-approval as event dates.  
While the results reported in the literature indicate that the U.S firms listing on major 
global equity markets do not benefit from the listing, the foreign firms that list on U. S 
markets experience significant share-price reactions104.  
The most comprehensive studies on the issue are those of Miller (1999)
105
 and Foerster 
and Karolyi (1999)
106
. Miller (1999) employs an event study with a 180-day event 
window around the cross-listing announcement dates; Miller uses daily returns and finds 
that there is a positive abnormal return of 1.15 percent. This means that the average firm 
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value increases by 1.15 percent as a result of cross-listings. This indicates that the 
investors realize that the cross-listing of these firms would be to their advantage.   
Foerster and Karolyi (1999)
107
 use Miller’s sample but employ weekly returns and a two-
year event window. They discover that there is a positive average abnormal return of 1% 
and that the pre-announcement weekly abnormal return increases by 10%, while the post-
announcement weekly abnormal return decreases by 9%. Their most significant finding is 
that the share price reaction is as pronounced for developed-market firms as for 
emerging-market firms. This finding confirms Miller’s findings and demonstrates that 
cross-listings provide a good opportunity for foreign firms to reap benefits and increase 
their firm value. This study also shows that the benefits from cross-listings are still 
significant even though firms come from countries with varying levels of corporate 
governance. 
A few studies look for the reasons why foreign firms want to issue DRs in the U.S. 
market. The results of these studies are presented below. 
 
Why the foreign firms pursue ADRs: 
These studies show that there are a number of reasons why foreign firms issue ADRs: 
first, to access low cost capital; second, to increase the liquidity of their stocks; third, to 
increase their prestige.     
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Karolyi (2006)
108
 surveys the literature involving ADRs and forms several theories as to 
why the foreign firms issue ADRs, despite the resulting risks. 
He theorizes that foreign firms take the opportunity of issuing ADRs to access low cost 
capital. He explains that when ADRs are issued in U.S. markets, U.S. investors can buy 
them as easily as they buy the stocks of U.S.-based firms; the more that U.S. investors 
buy, the better the opportunities for foreign firms to mobilize the capital in U.S. markets. 
This source of capital is not easy to acquire if these foreign firms do not issue ADRs 
because of the many difficulties of international investment barriers that block U.S 
investors from directly buying foreign stocks. Thus, the issuance of ADRs is an 
opportunity for foreign firms to access low cost capital in the U.S. stock markets.  
The second reason that foreign firms issue ADRs is to increase the liquidity of their 
stock. Several studies have noted that issuance of ADRs by foreign firms in a high 
liquidity equity market like U.S. market helps increase the liquidity of their 
stock109.These studies explain that when foreign firms issue ADRs, their stocks’ trading is 
expanded from one market (the local market) to two markets (the local market and the 
U.S. market); thus, the liquidity of the firms’ stocks is increased. These studies also 
explain that the reputational impact on the foreign firms issuing ADRs. When a stock 
somehow gains recognition, the investors might buy more of this stock and thus increase 
its liquidity.   
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Various studies110 have shown that the prestige of the foreign firms issuing ADRs is 
another motivation for them to list their ADRs on the U.S. markets. These studies 
indicate that the U.S. market has an advanced legal infrastructure that requires ADR 
issuers to comply with the requirements of high standards in their financial reporting; this 
advanced legal system also efficiently protects the rights of the minority investors from 
any fraud by the majority investors or by the firms’ managers. Thus, when foreign firms 
issue ADRs, the investors both in the local market and in the U.S. market have more faith 
in the quality of these foreign firms; this leads to reduced risk premiums and 
consequently an increase the ADR issuing firm’s value.    
The reasons described above are positive factors that persuade foreign firms to issue 
ADRs. However, there are negative factors that may inhibit them from engaging in the 
issuance of ADRs. Karolyi (1998 and 2006)
111
 describes some of these negative factors 
that foreign firms have to deal with when they want to issue ADRs: first, the foreign 
firms have to convert their accounting reports to fit the standards of U.S. markets; 
second, they are required to comply with additional disclosure requirements and to deal 
with other listing costs. In order to comply with these requirements, foreign firms have to 
pay more and change their managerial reporting systems.   
As analyzed above, there are some positive and some negative factors impacting the 
foreign firms’ decisions about issuing ADRs. Foreign firms must consider both the 
positive and the negative reasons before deciding whether they should issue ADRs. 
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Based on the examination of recent studies in the field of cross-listings, Karolyi theorizes 
four possible factors that boost the value of the cross-listing firms: (1) overcoming 
market segmentation, (2) increased market liquidity, (3) improved information disclosure, 
and (4) better investor protection (bonding).112      
 
3.3.1. Market segmentation 
Globalization helps DR issuers from home countries that are isolated from world market 
to access to capital sources with lower costs, diversify their capital resources and 
decrease their systematic risk exposure. As a result, access to international capital 
markets helps decrease the market segmentation and increase the value of ADR issuers.   
Karolyi
113
 states that in recent decades, the world has been witnessing a rapid 
development of technology that in turn accelerates the process of globalization in many 
fields of the economy and in society at large. In the financial field, investors have been 
witnessing the fact that international financial markets are progressively becoming one 
huge, integrated, global capital market. The companies involved in this process have a 
good chance to benefit from the process of globalization. One of these benefits is the 
opportunity to reduce cost of capital and increase their share value. It is not difficult to 
imagine the reasons why the firms involved in the process of financial globalization 
attain lower cost of capital. There are two channels leading to cost reduction:  first, ability 
to raise capital at a lower cost; second, the benefits from diversification of sources of 
capital.   
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The traditional argument about why cross-listing boosts firm value is that cross-listing 
helps foreign firms overcome international investment barriers and reduce the cost of 
capital as the risk premium resulting from the investment barriers dissipates 114 . The 
broader the range of capital markets that firms can access, the lower the cost of capital 
the firms can achieve.  
According to the market segmentation hypothesis, the value boost the cross-listed firms 
can achieve depends on the degree to which the home country is integrated into the world 
capital markets. The more closely integrated the home country of the cross-listed firms is 
with the world capital markets, the lower the value these firms extract when they cross-
list. In contrast, the less closely integrated the home country of the cross-listed firms is, 
the higher the value these firms can extract when they cross-list. The logic behind this 
argument is that if the home country of the cross-listed firms is somewhat isolated from 
the world capital market, these firms have lesser chance of accessing global capital 
markets where they can borrow with low cost or diversify their capital. As a result, the 
only alternative these firms have is to borrow at a high cost. Afterwards, if an isolated 
country decides to participate in the world market, the big gap in the cost of capital 
between the isolated country and the world capital market is diminished, and the cross-
listed firms can borrow capital at substantially lower cost, and, thus, their firm value is 
increased significantly. In contrast, if the home country of the cross-listed firms is more 
integrated with the world capital market, these firms are likely to borrow capital with 
lower cost or are able to diversify their capital. In reality, the gap between the cost of 
capital in the given country and the world market is small; therefore, if this country 
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decides to participate more in the world market, the cross-listed firms in this country may 
not be able to acquire capital at substantially lower cost. Consequently, their firm value 
could not increase significantly.  
Many studies have examined this argument, and their results are presented in the 
following section. 
Miller (1999)
115
 explores the difference between the stock returns (around the 
announcement to issue the ADRs) of the foreign firms from the developed countries and 
those from the emerging countries. He discovers that cross-listing in the U.S. market is 
associated with significantly higher announcement returns for the firms from the 
emerging countries compared to those for the firms from the developed countries. Lins et 
al. (2005)
116
 emphasize the importance of access to external capital markets, especially 
for the firms from the emerging countries. Peter Roosenboom and Mathijs A. van Dijk 
(2009)
117
 examine the impact of the cross-listing on many different stock markets in the 
world. Their study reveals that cross-listings has a significantly positive impact on almost 
all of the markets; they also discover that this impact varies in the different markets. The 
results show that there is an average increase of announcement return of 1.3% on the U.S. 
exchanges, 1.1% on the London Stock Exchange, 0.6% on exchanges in Continental 
Europe, and 0.5% (not statistically significant) on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
 
3.3.2. Market liquidity 
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There have been many studies conducted to determine whether cross-listings help to 
increase the liquidity of foreign firms. Even though these studies use various 
measurements that represent the firms’ liquidity, the results of these studies consistently 
show that cross-listing tends to increase the foreign firms’ liquidity.    
In their surveys of corporate managers who have cross-listed their firms on the foreign 
stock markets, Fanto and Karmel (1997)
118
 present evidence that the increase in liquidity 
motivates them to issue ADRs in the U.S. market. Karolyi (1998)
119
 in his survey of 
studies about the effects of cross-listings on the foreign firms’ liquidity confirms the 
hypothesis that liquidity changes as a response to cross-listings. Early studies by Tinic 
and West (1974)
120
 on 112 Canadian stocks listed on the U.S. stock market find evidence 
that those stocks have lower bid-ask spreads than their purely domestically-traded 
counterparts (these lower bid-ask spreads show higher liquidity). Noronha, Sarin and 
Saudagaran (1996)
121
 show that there are no measurable differences in daily weighed-
average spreads for U.S. companies after they list on the London and Tokyo exchanges. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999)
122
 provide evidence that there is a 29% increase in intraday 
volume and a 44 basis-point decline in intraday effective spread for 52 Canadian 
companies that list on U.S. stock exchanges.            
The studies about the effects of cross-listing on the cross-listed firms’ liquidity also find 
that cross-listing on stock markets that have high liquidity can lead to an increase in the 
cross-listed firms’ liquidity and a decrease in their cost of capital. Smith and Sofianos 
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(1996)123 find a substantial increase in the combined value of trading for a sample of the 
cross-listed firms on the NYSE. Silva and Chávez (2008)
124
 find that Latin American 
firms with an ADR do not always exhibit a liquidity advantage in the local market. 
Halling et al. (2008) document that for cross-listing on U.S. market, the fraction of 
trading that occurs on the destination market is greater for firms from countries that are 
geographically close to the U.S. and for firms from less developed countries. 
 
3.3.3. Information disclosure 
When foreign firms issue DRs in world markets, they know that they have to adapt to a 
new environment that requires a higher level of information disclosure. Even though this 
requirement increases the compliance cost for the DR issuers, it also helps increase their 
prestige in the eyes of investors. This increase in prestige usually increases their stock 
price, which can offset the compliance costs and, as a result, increase the firm value.           
Coffee (1999)
125
 notes that a good legal system built up by the governments from 
developed countries is designed to protect fraud. A century of experience in developed 
countries testifies to the fact that their legal systems have changed continuously to protect 
the legal rights of both majority and minority investors. The U.S. system of securities 
regulation is one of the most advanced structures of those of the developed countries. 
That not only indicates a higher standard of disclosure but also directly seeks to reduce 
agency costs. In recent years, harmonization of higher standards of disclosure from 
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developed economies helped worldwide issuers, especially those from emerging 
economies, providing transaction cost saving and giving them access to many markets in 
the world. The U.S. legal system is very strict; it limits the power of majority 
shareholders and protects the rights of minority shareholders. As a result, agency costs 
are reduced, large firms can sell more shares in public markets, the cost of capital is 
reduced, and the economy grows. Fuerst (1998)
126
 studies the relationship between the 
willingness of managers of cross-listed firms and the level of regulatory strictness of the 
market where they intend to list their depositary receipts. The study finds that the 
regulatory strictness of the stock markets of developed countries such as the U.S. or 
United Kingdom has a positive relationship with the willingness of the firms’ managers 
who intend to cross-list their depositary receipts on foreign stock markets. The study 
confirms that the stricter the regulatory environment, the higher the willingness of the 
cross-listed firms’ managers to cross-list in that stock market. The study explains that in a 
stricter regulatory environment, the cross-listed firms are required to disclose more of 
their private information about the minority investors’ protection. This requirement 
increases the firms’ costs because the firm has to complete several procedures to satisfy 
it; however, this increased cost is being offset by higher stock prices when the investors 
realize that the firm value is higher in a stricter legal environment. The managers know 
the benefit the firm can gain in a stricter legal environment; therefore, they are willing to 
list in stock markets that have stricter legal environments.     
Many scholars argue that firms in a country with a weak national legal system and feeble 
national financial system have to deal with many difficulties to gain the investors’ 
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confidence. However, they state that these firms can develop despite the disadvantageous 
legal environment. They argue that these firms can build up some bonding strategies with 
foreign partners, who usually come from developed countries where the legal system is 
strong in order to build up investors’ confidence. These scholars explain that when 
foreign firms list their depositary receipts in the stock market of a developed country, 
they show investors that they voluntarily subject themselves to stricter requirements of 
corporate governance and hence bond themselves. It is argued that such “bonding” 
increases the investor confidence in these firms, and accordingly reduce cost of capital.  
Mitton (2002)
127
 finds that corporate governance has an important role not only at the 
country level but also at the firm level. This means that the firms should improve the 
quality of corporate governance in order to increase investors’ confidence and 
consequently increase firm value. Coffee (1999)
128
 states that in a weak legal 
environment, firms must design strategies to gain investors’ confidence. Durney & Kim 
(2005)
129
 find that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s choice of governance 
and disclosure practices and the following benefits: growth opportunities, external 
finance, and ownership concentration. They argue that if firms have a good corporate 
governance structure and disclosure practice, they can achieve high growth opportunities, 
acquire cheap external financial sources and diversified ownership concentration. These 
authors also indicate that these positive relationships are stronger in countries with 
weaker legal systems where firms meddle in governance and disclosure practices in 
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hopes of expanding growth opportunities, obtaining cheaper external finance, and 
increasing the ownership concentration.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Lafond (2006)
130
 find that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and “credit ratings”. They indicate that the stronger the 
quality of corporate governance, the higher the level of credit ratings and the lower the 
cost of capital the firms can obtain.  
An essential aspect of an advanced legal system such as the U.S. legal system is 
disclosure. Mitton (2002)
131
 argues that the disclosure quality is an important element of 
corporate governance. In contrast, disclosure is usually nonexistent in emerging 
economies. If the firms are listed in the U.S. securities markets, it means that they qualify 
for the U.S. stock exchanges and are thereby qualified in the minds of the investors. 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004)
132
 and Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005)
133
 find that 
cross-listings help firms in an emerging economy improve market valuation and solve 
capital constraints.  
Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998), and Moel (2001)
134
 show that firms can use cross-listings 
in advanced foreign markets with stringent disclosure requirements to prove their quality 
to investors. Some exchanges have more stringent disclosure requirements than others, 
but cross-listings do not affect the information environment of firms through compulsory 
disclosure alone. Baker et al. (2002), Lang et al. (2003a), and Lang et al. (2003b)
135
 show 
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that cross-listings are associated with increased media attention, greater analyst coverage, 
improved accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, and higher quality of accounting information. 
 
3.3.4. Investor protection 
Siegel (2005)
136
 argues that bonding is a commitment used by firms from emerging 
countries. These commitments are usually offered to their foreign partners during good 
economic times and ensure that majority shareholders will not take over/expropriate the 
assets of minority shareholders or outside partners/foreign investors during periods of 
economic shock. These commitments are extremely important not only for the short term 
but also for the long term operation of the firms. The outside partners or foreign investors 
are always paranoid about the safety of their capital and even more so during a crisis 
period. If the companies make a reliable commitment firmly guaranteed during a crisis 
period, then they would attract more investors and mobilize capital more readily.  
The commitment of the companies is only part of what the firms and the outside 
partners/dispersed partners have to get through together in order to satisfy each other. The 
other part is a guarantee by a legal system designed by the government to insure that the 
commitment of the firms would be honored.  
In the last two decades, there have been many debates about the rights of dispersed and 
concentrated ownership137. Initially, some scholars fashioned the “political” theory of 
corporate finance, which accounts for restrictions by U.S. laws on institutional 
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activism138. Based on this theory, the rights of dispersed ownership are better protected 
than the rights of concentrated ownership; however, this result is caused by political 
forces, not economic efficiency139. In recent years, many scholars who study dichotomies 
in rights between dispersed and concentrated ownership and the effects of these 
differences on the growth of stock markets suggest that legal protections for minority 
shareholders is a critical variable in the development of viable security markets140.  
Several studies reveal strong relationships among the development of a national legal 
system, the progress of a national financial system, and increases in national economic 
growth. They find that a weak national legal system results in a weak national financial 
system that adversely affects the firm’s ability to mobilize capital. La Porta et al. 
(1997)
141
 find strong evidence that the legal environment has pronounced effects on the 
size and breadth of capital markets across countries. The countries with poorer investor 
protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law 
enforcement, have narrower capital markets.  This finding applies to both debt and equity 
markets. These authors discover that the British common law has better investor 
protections for both shareholders and creditors against expropriation of insiders in 
comparison with French civil law; therefore, investors in countries under the English 
common law are willing to invest their money in capital markets and thereby help these 
markets to become more developed capital markets compared to countries subject to 
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French civil law. As a result, the British common law provides a good opportunity for 
external finance, including debt and equity, for the firms. Accordingly, these authors also 
find that richer countries have better law enforcement than poorer countries.  
Wurgler (2000)
142
 confirms La Porta et al.’s 1997 findings; he indicates that the 
protections of the minority investor rights are associated with better capital allocation. He 
shows that in developed financial systems, in which the minority investor rights are 
protected, investors would overinvest their capital in growing industries and limit their 
investment in declining industries. These effective investments build developed capital 
markets, and firms have better opportunities to acquire cheaper financial sources, 
including both debt and equity. 
Coffee (1999)
143
 says that, in an ideal world, a good legal system is developed by the 
governments from both developed and developing countries to protect the rights of the 
minority investors. This is only wishful thinking. Some studies found the legal systems in 
developing countries so weak that they are unable to protect the rights of the dispersed 
investors.  
It is fortunate that companies in developing economies can temporarily “borrow” the 
legal systems of the developed economies to help companies gain the trust of investors in 
their companies’ commitments. By setting up close cooperation with partners in 
developed countries, firms in developing economies can take advantage of the excellent 
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legal system of the developed countries to improve their operations. This also improves 
the minority investors’ confidence in the firms in which they invested144. 
How can the companies bond themselves and develop in a weak financial institutional 
setting? Some previous studies showed that these companies can use cross-listings. 
Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz (2004a)
145
 find that cross-listing helps companies earn the trust 
of outside investors, provides benefits to the companies and improves market valuation. 
Lins, Strickland, & Zenner (2005) and Roosenboom and Dijk (2009)
146
 find that firms in 
developing economies benefit from cross-listing in the U. S. stock markets. These authors 
state that when the ADR firms cross-list in the U.S. stock markets, they lower capital 
constraints by acquiring more opportunities to access external capital markets.    
Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999)
147
 argue that firms can “bond” themselves by cross-listing 
in stock exchanges with higher standards of investor protection in order to protect 
minority shareholders. Doidge et al. (2004a)
148
 model the cross-listing decision as a 
trade-off between private benefits of control and taking advantage of growth 
opportunities by bonding to reduce the cost of capital. They show that firms with cross-
listings in the U.S. have a higher valuation than non-cross-listed firms, especially when 
they have high growth opportunities. Reese and Weisbach (2002) and Lins et al. 
(2005)
149
 show that cross-listings by firms from countries with weaker investor 
protections lead to greater subsequent equity issues and a relaxation of capital constraints. 
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Doidge et al. (2004a)
150
 finds that the voting premiums of firms with dual-class shares are 
considerably lower for cross-listed firms. Chung (2006)
151
 argues that investor protection 
also affects the liquidity of ADRs.  
Overall, cross-listings help foreign firms (the DR issuers or ADR issuers) decrease the 
market segmentation, improve liquidity, and increase the prestige regarding information 
disclosure and minority shareholder protection. As a result, it helps foreign firms increase 
firm value.  
 
4. Hypotheses Development 
The hypotheses presented below represent some of the central testable predictions 
concerning the effects of the SOX Act on firm value using the crucial factors (the level of 
institutional development in the home market -developed and emerging countries-,  
listing exchange and firm-size) affecting the firm value of the ADR issuers. The 
preceding review of literature and the conceptual overview led to the development 
following four hypotheses:  
- Hypothesis 1: The CSARs before SOX and the CSARs after SOX are different. This 
hypothesis states that the difference between the CSARs in two periods (pre-SOX and 
post-SOX) is significant. This means that the economic effect of SOX on the ADR 
issuing firms’ value is significant. 
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- Hypothesis 2: The level of institutional development does not have differential effect on 
the CSARs measured in pre and post SOX periods.  In other words, the hypothesis states 
that the institutional domicile of the firm does not have any bearing on the impact of 
SOX. 
- Hypothesis 3: The CSAR differentials are not influenced by the listing market. This 
hypothesis supposes that regardless the listing market (NYSE or NASDAQ) the impact of 
the SOX on ADR issuing firms is insignificant.  
- Hypothesis 4: The firm size does not affect CSAR differentials; accordingly the impact 
of the SOX is neutral to firm size. 
 
5. Data and methodology 
5.1. Data       
The sample includes all ADRs (level-2 and level-3) listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
from 3/01/1994 to 12/31/2010.  This sample is divided into two groups: the first group 
includes the ADRs listed in the period from 7/31/2002 (when SOX was enacted) to 
12/31/2010; the second group includes the ADRs listed in the period from 3/01/1994 to 
7/31/2002. The length of each period is eight years and the entire sample spans a sixteen 
year period. The sample was divided into two groups to create a control group.  
The ADRs in the sample were collected from an ADR database maintained by the Bank 
of New York Mellon. The initial sample has 401 ADRs, in which there are 238 ADRs 
listed in the first period (referred to as pre-SOX period) and 163 ADRs listed in the 
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second period (referred to as post-SOX period).  The initial sample was narrowed down 
based on the availability of data. Consequently, the final sample includes 208 ADRs for 
the whole period under study, in which there are 85 ADRs in the post-SOX period and 
128 ADRs in the pre-SOX period. Since the objective of the study is to examine SOX’s 
effect on the ADR issuers, the date on which ADR issuance announced is chosen as the 
event day. The announcement date is the day the foreign firm announces the details 
regarding the issuance of an ADR on a particular U.S. stock market. It is also the first day 
the public receives information regarding the new ADR issue. The announcement date is 
different from the listing date because the latter is the first day the stock is listed and 
traded in the market, while the former occurs prior to listing and trading. To measure how 
much of an impact the announcement of an ADR issuance has in the issuer’s home 
market, the announcement date is used as the event date. 
Any ADR with an announcement date available in the database is considered for the final 
sample; otherwise it is eliminated from the final sample. The announcement dates were 
screened in NexisLexis® Academic database. 
The availability of the ADR announcement date is the first condition the ADRs must 
meet to be considered for the final sample. The second condition is the availability of the 
listing dates, which were drawn from Bank of New York Mellon. Sometimes, an ADR 
issuer announces its intention to issue an ADR; however, after this announcement the 
ADR issuer may not list their stock on a U.S. stock market for various reasons.  The 
failure to follow through or delay may have an impact on the firm value. However, the 
study excludes these cases from the sample. Overall, any ADR with the necessary 
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announcement information and data is included in the final sample.  Underlying stock 
price data and index values were extracted from DataStream.  
 
5.2   Methodology 
As discussed in the literature review, there are three factors that might impact the stock 
return around ADR issuance announcement date: the local market dynamics, the 
certification effect of the ADR issue and the potential implications of SOX.   In order to 
disentangle these three factors a controlled event study methodology is employed.  In 
order to capture the impact of ADR announcement a standard event study design is used. 
The event date in this set up is the “announcement date” of the ADR issuance.  If ADR 
issuance signals “bonding “ or an implicit improvement in corporate governance and 
therefore potentially lower cost of capital for the issuing firm, investors are expected to 
respond to the announcement with an anticipation of lower required returns. This should 
increase the firm value. If a comparison between the firm value in the wake of ADR 
issuance announcement can be made with the value that would prevail in the absence of 
the announcement, the impact of the announcement on the firm value can be isolated. 
Event study framework facilitates such comparisons and allows isolation of the impact of 
an event on the firm value.  While one can isolate the impact of the ADR issue 
announcement on the firm value, in the post-SOX period, this impact would also include 
the implications of the SOX regulations on the foreign firm’s issuing ADRs in the U.S. 
equity markets.  In order to capture the impact of the SOX regulation, two sets of event 
studies are conducted. The first set of event studies are conducted during the period 
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preceding the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. The impact of the ADR issuance 
announcements are captured for the sample firms during this period where the impact 
will only consist of certification effect of an ADR issue.  A second set of event studies 
are conducted on a matching sample which includes ADR announcements from the same 
industries, countries and by companies with similar size to the companies analyzed in the 
pre SOX period
152
. The announcement affects captured in the second period consist of 
combined effect of “certification” and “Sarbanes-Oxley act”.  The unexpected changes in 
firm values captured in both periods are compared and differences are tested for 
statistical significance. In order to elaborate on the methodology, standard event study 
methodology is introduced in the following section.  
 
5.2.1. Standard Event Study Methodology: 
An event study methodology is used to measure the impact of a specific event on firm 
value.  This methodology is supported by the theory that the effect of an event will be 
immediately reflected in security prices. To measure the effect of a specific economic 
event, researchers can use financial market data observed in a relatively short time 
period. In this study, the specific event is the announcement made by an ADR issuer 
regarding their intention to list its ADR.  
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The event study methodology has been applied in many fields such as finance, 
accounting, law, and economics. In these fields, the researchers use the event studies to 
measure the effects of mergers & acquisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new 
debt or equity, announcements of macro–economic variables such as the trade deficit, and 
changes in the regulatory environment. 
The event study methodology often focuses on one particular class of security, usually 
shares of common stock affected by the event. 
 
5.2.2. Market Model 
The event can take place at different points in time or clustered on a particular date. Let t 
stand for time when the event takes place and i stand for a class of security. The return of 
a sample security i at the time t is presented as: 
     =       +                 (1) 
where: 
    = return of security i at the time t (actual return) 
The returns are defined as follows: 
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1P = closing price of stock for the present day  
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1tP = closing price of stock for the previous day 
    = normal or expected or predicted return given a particular of expected return 
Kit=  +  Rmt+  it 
ARit = Rit - Kit = abnormal or unexpected return 
Therefore: 
ARit=    -       or eit=      = Rit-(   +  Rmt)          (3) 
where      = the intercept term  and    = the systematic risk of stock i 
Rmt = the rate of return on a market index (such as Standard & Poor’s 500 ) at the time t. 
The abnormal return ARit is the difference between the observed return and the predicted 
return. Furthermore, the abnormal return ARit is the difference between the return 
conditional on the event and the predicted return unconditional on the event. Therefore, 
the abnormal return is a direct measure of the unexpected change of the security’s return 
associated with the event. 
While there are several models that can be used to estimate the expected returns, in this 
study the market model used to estimate returns
153
.  Market model regression was used to 
estimate the model parameters α and β:  
    =    +        +                (4) 
 
where Rmt is daily the return on local market index of the ADR issuer in local currency, 
and Rit is the daily returns of the issuer in local currency
154
.  A 300-day period was used 
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to estimate parameters α and β for each company in the sample. Estimation period ranged 
from t = -11 to t = -310 where t = 0 is the event/announcement date.   The event window 
is defined as 10 days prior to the announcement date and 10 days after. The estimated 
coefficients α and β from the market model regression are used to predict the returns 
during the event window. As indicated earlier, the predicted returns represent expected 
returns based on all the available information during the estimation period. Any 
significant information following estimation period such as an earnings announcement, a 
major acquisition or fund raising attempt is likely to affect the stock returns and should 
create a deviation from the “model predicted returns”. Provided that the date that this 
material information becomes available can be accurately captured, the impact of the 
event on the firm value can be measured as the difference between the actual returns and 
the model predicted returns. These so called “abnormal returns” reflect the impact of the 
information that becomes available to the investors.  In the context of this study, firm 
returns were estimated during the event window, and were compared with the actual 
observed returns to capture the impact of ADR issuance announcements during the pre 
and post Sarbane-Oxley periods described above.  
The event dates in this study were determined based on the information released to the 
press. Since ADR issuing announcement has significant implications on firm’s perceived 
risk and cost of capital, investors are expected to react to this information by trading the 
shares. Although this information is expected to be incorporated to the prices instantly in 
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efficient markets, it is plausible that information leakages and proper interpretation of the 
news may lead to changes in stock prices before and after the event date (the date the 
information is assumed to become available to the market). Therefore a 21 day event 
window was used in this analysis which consistent with the event windows used in 
similar studies.  
 
5.2.3.   Standardized Abnormal Returns: 
In the event studies, cross-sectional regression analysis plays an important role. In order 
to capture the relative influence of the independent variables having different units of 
measurement, an essential step required in advance is the standardization of all variables 
in the cross-sectional regression models. This process results in standardized regression 
coefficients.  
The standardization of the abnormal returns (SARs)
155
 is expressed as follows: 
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Where 
 jtSAR SAR for firm j at time t 
 jtAR AR for firm j at time t 
 
jtjt ARAR
ss2 square root of the variance of the AR for firm j at time t 
   = standard deviation of the AR for firm j at time t 
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The  variance is given by the following equation
156
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Where 
 2
jtAR
s variance of the AR for firm j at time t 
 ).( periodestjtAR AR for firm j at time t over the estimation period 
 ).(
____
periodestjAR mean AR for firm j over the estimation period 
 jD number of observed trading-day returns for firm j over the estimation period 
 ).( windoweventmtR return on the local market at time t over the event window 
 ).( periodestmtR return on the local market at time t over the estimation period 
 ).(
__
periodestmR mean return on the local market over the estimation period 
 
5.2.4. Cross-sectional Aggregation 
In event studies, an event’s average effect on the cross section of the firms  is referred to 
as “Total SAR” or “TSAR” .  The TSAR measures the event’s average effect on firm 
value of all firms in the sample for each day in the event window. Then, a statistical test 
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is performed using the TSAR values for each day of the event window to determine 
whether they are significant. The result of this test helps evaluate whether the event’s 
effect is significant for the firm value of all firms in the sample for each day in the event 
window
157
.  
The TSAR is defined as follows
158
:     
    


N
j
jtt SARTSAR
1          (7)  
  
 
            Where 
 tTSAR total SAR for each day in the event window 
 jtSAR SAR of firm j at time t. 
  N = number of firms in sample. 
 
After the TSARs are calculated, statistical test are performed to determine if they are 
significant. 
The Z-statistic on the TSAR is given by 
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where 
tZ Z statistic for each day in the event window 
tTSAR TSAR for each day in the event window 
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jD  
number of observed trading-day returns for the firm j over the estimation period 
N= number of firms in the sample 
 
5.2.5. Time-series Aggregation (CTSAR) 
In an event study, researchers are interested in measuring the effects of the event not only 
at a given event date “t” but also before and after the event date.  The cumulative or 
aggregated impact of the event over a given interval may reveal the diffusion speed of the 
event in the market
159
.   In order to capture the cumulative impact of the event 
individually, SARs are cumulated over a selected interval individually to calculate 
CSARs. Alternatively TSARs are cumulated over a selected interval to calculate 
CTSARs. The CTSARs capture the impact of the event on the cross section of the firms 
on in a given interval. Depending upon the objective of the analysis, the CTSAR can be 
cumulated into intervals of two or more days or over the whole event window. The 
CTSARs are tested to determine whether they are statistically significant.  
The CTSAR is defined as follows
160
:         
Cumulative 
21 ,TT
TSAR  = 

2
1
T
Tt
tTSAR
         (9)
 
 
where: 
Cumulative 
2,1 TT
TSAR  = cumulative TSAR for each day in the event window 
  tTSAR  = TSAR for each day in the event window 
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  1T  = earliest date in the event window (-10) 
2T  = latest date in the event window (+10) 
The Z-statistic for  the CTSAR is given as follows
161
: 
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Where: 
  tZ  the cumulative TSAR Z-statistic for each day in the event window 
  N = number of firms in the sample  
  jtSAR  = SAR for firm j for each day in the event window 
  1T = earliest date in the event window (-10) 
  2T = latest date in the event window (ranges from -10 through +10) 
  jD = number of observed trading day returns for firm over the estimation 
period 
 
5.3. Controlled Event Study and Isolation of SOX Effect with Matched Pairs 
As briefly described above, in order to capture the impact of the SOX regulation, two sets 
of event studies are conducted. The first set of event studies covered the period preceding 
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the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Using the SARs of each firm in the first sub-
period, cumulative SARs (CSARs) are calculated for various event windows. The CSAR  
is defined as 
 
2
1
,
T
t j tj
t T
CSAR SAR

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          (11)
 
 
where: 
                       tjCSAR  = cumulative SAR of firm j for a whole event window 
  tjSAR  = SAR of firm j 
for each day in the event window 
  1T  = earliest date in the event window (-10) 
2T  = latest date in the event window (+10) 
 
The CSARs in the pre-SOX period represent the certification impact of the ADR issue 
announcements for each firm. In other words, investor reactions in this period reflect only 
the perceived impact of an ADR issue with no novel regulatory consideration. In contrast, 
CSARs calculated in the post-SOX period reflect a combination certification effect and 
the perceptions related to Sarbanes-Oxley regulation.  Hence, it is conjectured that the 
differences in CSARs between the matching pairs of ADR announcements represent the 
impact of Sarbanes Oxley legislation on the ADR issuers.  To ensure that as many factors 
as possible are controlled, 80 matching pairs of pre-SOX and post-SOX ADR issues are 
identified.  CSARs for each company representing the pair individually calculated. 
Consequently, 80 CSAR differentials were calculated and the significance of the 
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differences are tested.  Statistically significant cross sectional differences point to the 
significance of SOX legislation.   
 
5.3.1. Cross-sectional Analysis of CSAR Differentials 
The significance of the CSAR Differentials described in the previous section reveal the 
perceived impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on the ADR issuing firms. It is plausible to 
anticipate some cross sectional variation in the impact depending on the origin of the 
issuing firm, the listing market and firm size.  
The origin of the ADR issuing firm matters because of the degree of segmentation. The 
argument is that the higher the degree of segmentation of the market where the ADRs 
originate from or list their underlying stocks, the higher the expected impact on the firm 
value when these firms announce ADR issues.  Miller (1999)
162
 uses institutional origin 
(developed versus emerging market) as a proxy for the degree of market segmentation. 
He argues that share value is affected by international restrictions on capital flows; 
therefore, the price reaction of cross-listing will differ from market to market depending 
on the degree of restriction. The countries that erect a high barrier against capital flows 
will experience larger abnormal returns upon cross-listing.   
A similar proxy is employed in this study and matched ADR pairs were classified into 
emerging and developed country groups. An institutional origin dummy variable entitled 
“DEVELOPED/EMERGING” was used and assigned value of 1 if the matched pair is 
from a developed market and zero otherwise.  
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The listing market of the ADR has implications on the liquidity of the ADRs upon 
issuance. Earlier studies (e.g. Miller (1998), Merton (1987) and Chuhan (1992)
163
) 
indicate that the higher the recognition by the investors of the stock exchange where the 
ADRs are listed, the higher the ADRs’ liquidity and the higher the expected valuation 
impact.  Miller (1999) uses prominence of an exchange as a proxy for the effect of 
liquidity and investor recognition. He argues that when firms are listed on a major 
exchange, they have a good chance of getting recognized by investors and using the vast 
liquidity of such an exchange to increase their liquidity.  Merton (1987) argues that an 
increase in “investor recognition” lowers the investors’ required return and increase the 
firm value. Chuhan (1992) argues that the greatest barrier when for emerging market 
investments is  the liquidity problem; this can be solved with cross-listing in a prominent 
exchange, which in turn is expected to have a positive impact on the firm value.   
Accordingly we differentiate the listing market of the ADRs and use an exchange dummy 
(NYSE versus NASDAQ) as a proxy to test a joint hypothesis that liquidity and investor 
recognition segment the international capital market. The dummy variable 
“NYSE/NADAQ” takes value 1 if the ADR issue announcement indicates listing in 
NYSE and 0 otherwise.  
Earlier studies analyzing the impact of the SOX regulation pointed to the fact that firms’ 
absorption capacity of the regulatory costs depend on their size. These studies indicate 
that the larger the firm-size of the U.S. public firms, the lesser the burden these firms 
have to bear. Alexander (2010)
164
 conducted a survey on managers regarding the 
compliance costs of SOX; he found that the smallest firms are the most severely 
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burdened by these costs, whereas the largest firms are not. He argues that the benefits of 
the act outweigh the compliance costs in the large firms at the expense of small firms. 
Furthermore, several studies and surveys find that firm size has an important role in the 
firm’s reaction to the act’s effect on the firm value.165 These studies indicate that small 
firms with firm value of float under $75 million are burdened with more compliance costs 
than the medium-size firms. Consequently, these studies establish that small firms are 
likely to face more negative effects than medium and large firms when they are impacted 
by the act. In order to explore the linkage between the firm size and the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley act, matched pairs of firms were divided into small, medium and large 
firm categories. Firms with a market capitalization of under $75 million are categorized 
as small firms. Firms with market capitalization above $75 million but under $700 
million are categorized as medium size firms. Finally firms with market capitalization 
above $700 million, are categorized as large firms.                
In order to explore the relationship between these variables and the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act, difference between the Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Returns 
(CSARs) in the post-SOX period and the CSARs in the pre-SOX period for various 
windows are used as dependent variable in various cross-sectional regressions. In each 
cross-sectional regression, CSAR differentials for a particular event window are used as 
dependent variable.  
 
5.3.2. The cross-sectional Regression Model 
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        =    +               +    DEVELOP/EDEMERGING +   FIRMSIZE+ 
                                                                                                                                        (12) 
 
where: 
        = the difference between the CSARs in the post-SOX period and that those in 
the pre-SOX period at the event window i 
   = the intercept 
i = the regression coefficients (i=1,2,3) 
           = NYSE or NASDAQ where the ADRs listed 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING = Developed country or emerging country where the ADR 
lists the underlying stocks 
FIRMSIZE = Firm size of the ADRs 
E (    = 0 
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6. The results and discussion  
6.1. The results 
6.1.1. The general results of the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the two periods: 
the pre-SOX and the post-SOX 
The results of the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the two periods (the pre-SOX and the 
post-SOX) clearly demonstrate that the CTSAR in both periods is significant.  
Even though the primary objective of this study is to find SOX’s effects by examining 
whether the difference of the CSARs in the two periods (the pre-SOX and the post-SOX) 
is significant; the result of the CTSARs in each period also yields a useful discovery. 
The CTSARs in the pre-SOX period represent the ADR issue’s effect on the firm value 
before SOX was enacted, and the CTSARs in the post-SOX period represent the ADR 
issue’s effect on the firm value after SOX was enacted. The results of the CTSARs in the 
two periods give a general evaluation about the ADR issue’s effect in these two periods. 
There have been a number of studies involving the ADR issue’s effect on firm value 
(Miller, Karolyi and Litvak), but by using a different sample and a different 
methodology, the result varies. 
  
6.1.1.a. The results of the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the pre-SOX period  
(Insert table 1a in here) 
The result of the statistical tests on the CTSAR in this period shows significance.  
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Overall, the results of the CTSARs in this period show that all the values from the first 
day to the 21st day in the 21-day event window are positive; this demonstrates that in the 
pre-SOX period, the ADR issue helps increase the stock return and also the firm value of 
the ADR issuers. 
Even though the results of the CTSARs show positive values for all days in the event 
window, the CTSARs of each day in the first nine days of the event window do not show 
significance (at the test level is of 5 percent). The CTSAR at the ninth day has z-value 
and p-value of 1.45 and 0.15, respectively. On the tenth day, one day before the date 
event, the CTSAR becomes significant with z-value and p-value of 1.95 and 0.05, 
respectively. From this date to the last date of the event window, including the last 12 
days in the event window, the CTSAR of each day maintains a significant value. On the 
event date, the CTSAR’s significance reaches an especially high level with a z-value and 
p-value of 2.63 and 0.009, respectively.  
Overall, the last 12 dates of the event window all have significant values; there are nine 
dates significant at a level of 5 percent and 3 dates significant at a level of 10 percent. 
The three dates significant at 10 percent are dates 14, 16 and 21 in the event window.  
The z-value and p-value of the 20
th
 (the date before the last date of the event window) are 
2.01 and 0.04, respectively. The 21st date, the last date of the event window, has a z-
value and p-value of 1.88 and 0.06, respectively.  
In conclusion, even though the results of the first nine days in the 21- day event window 
do not show significance (at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels), those of the 
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last 12 days in the event window show significance; therefore, the statistical tests of the 
CTSARs in the pre-SOX period are significant.   
 
6.1.1.b. The results of the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the post-SOX period  
(Insert table 1.b here) 
The results of the statistical tests on the CTSAR in this period also show significance. 
One again, as the results in the pre-SOX period foreshadowed, the results of the CTSARs 
in this period show that all values from the first day to the 21st day in the 21-day event 
window are positive; this demonstrates that the ADR issue helps increase the stock return 
and also the firm value of the ADR issuers in the post-SOX period.  
In terms of significant dates in the event window, there is little difference between the 
two periods.  There are eight significant dates in the post-SOX period in comparison with 
12 significant dates in the pre-SOX period.  
The same occurrence appears in the pre-SOX period; even though the results of the 
CTSARs show positive value for all days in the event window, the CTSARs of each day 
in the first nine days of the event window are not significant (at the 5 percent level). The 
CTSAR on the ninth day has a z-value and a p-value of 1.35 and 0.18, respectively. On 
the tenth day, one day before the date event, the CTSAR becomes significant with a z-
value and a p-value of 1.88 and 0.06, respectively (the test level at 10 percent). 
After this significant date, the next four dates, including the event date and the 12
th
, 13
th
 
and 14
th
 dates, show insignificance.    
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The last seven dates in the event window show significance; the 15
th
 and 16
th
 dates are 
significant at the test level of 10 percent and the last 5 dates are significant at the test 
level of 5 percent. 
The z-value and the p-value of the 20
th
 (the date before the last date of the event window) 
are 2.04 and 0.04, respectively. The 21th date, the last date on the event window, has a z-
value and p-value of 2.07 and 0.04, respectively.  
Overall, even though the results of the first nine days in the 21- day event window and 
the four dates including the event date and the 12th, 13th and 14th dates do not show 
significance (at the test levels of 5 percent or 10 percent), those of the last 7 days in the 
event window do show significance; therefore, the statistical tests of the CTSARs in the 
post-SOX is significant.  
In conclusion, the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the pre-SOX period before SOX was 
enacted are significant, and the statistical tests on the CTSARs in the post-SOX period 
are also significant. 
 
6.1.2. The mean difference of the post-SOX’s CSARs and the pre-SOX’s CSARs- the 
SOX’s effects  
(Insert table 2 here) 
There are eight event windows analyzed, including (-10,10), (0,10), (0,5), (0,3), 
(0,1),(0,0), (-1,1) and (-3,3). The results of each event window are presented in the 
following section. 
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The means of the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period are 0.89 and 0.69, 
respectively at window (-10, 10).  The mean difference of the two periods has a z-value 
of 0.508 and a p-value 0.611 with significance level of 5 percent.   
The means of the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period are -0.11 and 0.25, 
respectively at window (0). The mean difference of the two periods has a z-value and a p-
value of -2.82 and 0.005, respectively.   This is significant at the test level of 5 percent.   
At window (0, 1), the means of the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period are -0.19 
and 0.30, respectively. The mean difference of the two periods has a z-value and a p-
value of -2.3 and 0.02, respectively with significance at the test level of 5 percent.   
The result of event window (0, 3) suggests that the mean of the post-SOX period is -0.10 
the mean of the pre-SOX period 0.20. The mean difference of the two periods has a z-
value and a p-value of -0.73 and 0.46, respectively at 5 percent significance level.   
At window (0, 5), the means the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period are 0.07 and 
0.21, respectively. The mean difference of the two periods has a z-value of -0.36 and a p-
value of 0.72 at 5 percent significance level.  
The result of event window (0, 10) suggests that the mean of the post-SOX period is 0.32 
and the mean of the pre-SOX period is 1.71. The mean difference of the two periods has 
a z-value of -2.1 and a p-value of 0.035. Here the significance level is 5 percent as well. 
At event window (-1, 1), the mean of the post-SOX period is -0.20 and the mean of pre-
SOX period is 0.15. Here the mean difference of the two periods has a z-value and a p-
value of -0.87 and 0.38, respectively with significance level of 5 percent.   
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At event window (-3, 3), the mean of the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period are 
0.34 and -0.83, respectively. Here, the mean difference of the two periods has a z-value 
of -2.3 and a p-value of 0.02 with significance level of 5 percent.   
Overall, in the eight event windows chosen to measure the SOX’s effect, the results 
suggests that there are four significant event windows ((-10,10), (0,3), (0,5) and (-1,1)) at 
test level of 5 percent and four other insignificant event windows ((0,0), (0,1), (0,10) and 
(-3,3)) at the same significance level. The results of the statistical test on the event 
window (-10, 10) are critical because this event window covers the entire 21-day event 
window. However, the test result does not show significance. On the other hand, the 
results of event windows (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 10) prove to be statistically significant.   
 
6.1.3. The mean difference of the post-SOX’s SARs and the pre-SOX’s SARs in each 
date of the event window/ SOX’s effect 
(Insert table 3 here) 
Here the test results of these mean differences vary.  52.38 percent of these tests are 
significant and 47.62 percent of them are insignificant.  The results of the statistical tests 
of the mean differences for each date in the event window between the two periods are 
presented below. 
On day (-10), the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.15, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 
0.02; the means of both periods are positive, and more significantly, the post-SOX 
period’s mean is larger than that of the pre-SOX period. The values of z and p for the 
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statistical test are -1.6 and 0.11, respectively with significance at a test level of 5 percent.  
On day (-9), the post-SOX period’s mean is -0.11, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is -
0.27. The means of both periods are negative, and the post-SOX period’s mean is larger 
than that of the pre-SOX period. The values of z and p for the statistical test are -1.1 and 
0.27, respectively. Here the significance level is at 5 percent.  Day (- 8) shows that the 
post-SOX period’s mean is 0.03, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.13; the means of 
both periods are positive, and the post-SOX period’s mean is less than that of the pre-
SOX period. The values of Z and p for the statistical test are -1.11 and 0.27, respectively 
with significance level of 5 percent.  
The result of day (-7) suggests that the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.09, and the pre-SOX 
period’s mean is -1.04. The values of z and p for the statistical test are -3.86 and 0, 
respectively with significance level of 5 percent.  On event window (-6), the post-SOX 
period’s mean is -0.04, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.40.  The value of z is -1.80 
and the value of p is 0.07 with significance level of 10 percent.    Result at window (-5) 
states that the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.20, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.01. 
The values of z and p for the statistical test are -1.14 and 0.25, respectively with 
significance level of 5 percent.  
On day (-4), the post-SOX period’s mean is -0.18, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 
0.31. The values of z and p for the statistical test are -3.04 and 0.00, respectively. Here 
the significance is at a test level of 5 percent.  Similarly, on day (-3), the post-SOX 
period’s mean is 0.17, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is -0.35. Here, the values of z and 
p for the statistical test are -2.57 and 0.01, respectively with significance level of 5 
percent.   
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On the event day (-2), the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.09, and the pre-SOX period’s 
mean is -0.16.  Hence, the values of z and p for the statistical test are -1.53 and 0.13, 
respectively. Here the significance level is, once again, 5 percent.  And on day (-1), the 
post-SOX period’s mean is 0.17, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is -0.24. The values of 
Z and p for the statistical test are -2.29 and 0.02, respectively. This result shows that the 
mean difference for each date in the event window between the two periods is reasonably 
significant at a test level of 5 percent.  Similarly, day (0) shows a mean of -0.11 for the 
post-SOX period and 1.14 for the pre-SOX period.  Here, the values of z and p for the 
statistical test are -1.69 and 0.091, respectively. This result shows that the mean 
difference for each date in the event window between the two periods is not significant at 
a test level of 5 percent.  
Day (1) shows that the post-SOX period’s mean is -0.08, and the pre-SOX period’s mean 
is 0.25. The values of Z and p for the statistical test are -1.79 and 0.07, respectively with 
significance level at 10 percent.  On day (2) the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.06, and the 
pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.05. The values of z and p for the statistical test are -0.28 and 
0.78, respectively at 5 percent significance level. On day (3) the post-SOX period’s mean 
is 0.03, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is -0.52. Here the values of z and p for the 
statistical test are -2.68 and 0.01, respectively at 5 percent significance level.  Day (4) 
shows that the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.19, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.41. 
The values of z and p for the statistical test are -1.27 and 0.21, respectively with 5 percent 
significance.   
Days 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 show statistical significance of 5 percent. For day 5 the post-
SOX period’s mean is -0.02, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is -0.59The values of z and 
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p for the statistical test are -2.76 and 0.01, respectively.  For day 6, the post-SOX period’s 
mean is 0.13, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.61. The values of z and p for the 
statistical test are -2.98 and 0.00, respectively. For day 7, the mean values of the post-
SOX period is 0.17, and the mean for the pre-SOX period is 1.22. The values of z and p 
for the statistical test are -3.06 and 0.00, respectively. For day (8) the post-SOX period’s 
mean is -0.15, and the pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.01. The values of z and p for the 
statistical test are -1.01 and 0.31.  On fay (9) the post-SOX period’s mean is 0.05, and the 
pre-SOX period’s mean is 0.  The z and p values for the statistical test are -0.18 and 0.86.  
Finally, day (10) indicates that the mean for the post-SOX period is 0.06, and for the pre-
SOX periods 0.29.  Z value here is -1.30 and p value is 0.19. 
A summary of the overall results of this section is presented as follows: 
Since there are 21 days in the event window, the comparison of the mean of the SARs for 
each date of the post-SOX period with that for each corresponding date (the same date in 
the event window) of the pre-SOX period gives 21 individual results, of which there are 
11 of these dates (52.38 percent of all dates in the event window) that show significant 
differences between the compared means and there are 10 of those dates (47.62 percent 
of all dates in the event window) that show insignificant differences between the 
compared means. Of the 11 individual dates that show significance, 8 of these dates 
(72.72 percent) show significant differences at a test level of 5 percent and 3 of these 
dates (27.28 percent) that show significant differences at a test level of 10 percent. 
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The mean of the SARs for each date in the 21-day event window in the post-SOX period 
are positive for 14 dates and negative for 7 dates, while the means are positive for 13 
dates and negative for 8 dates in the pre-SOX period. 
After comparing the mean of the SARs for each date in the event window with that in the 
other period, the findings show that there are 11 dates for which the mean in the post-
SOX period is larger than that in the pre-SOX period and 10 dates for which the mean in 
the post-SOX period is less than that in the pre-SOX period. 
 
6.1.4. The results of the cross-sectional regression  
(Insert table 4 in here) 
 In order to examine the effects of some factors on the CSARs, this study uses the values 
of the CSARs in eight windows: (-10,10), (0,10), (0,5), (0,3), (0,1),(0,0), (-1,1), and (-
3,3). These windows are the same as those used for the mean difference analysis of the 
CSARs and SARs. The results show that two of the factors, DEVELOPED/EMERGING 
and NYSE/NASDAQ, have significant effects on SOX’s effect while the remaining 
factor, FIRMSIZE, has an insignificant effect on SOX’s effect. The results also show that 
two factors, DEVELOPED/EMERGING and FIRMSIZE have a negative impact, while 
the NYSE factor produces a positive effect on SOX’s effect.       
The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented as follow: 
At window (-10, 10), the values of the standardized coefficient (δ) and p of the variable 
of DEVELOPED/EMERGING are respectively -0.21 and 0.06, while the value of the 
 
   
92 
 
standardized coefficient (δ) and p of the variable of NYSE/NASDAQ are respectively 
0.21 and 0.10 and the value of the standardized coefficient (δ) and p of the variable of 
FIRMSIZE are respectively -0.23 and 0.86. If the test level is set at 10 percent, the result 
shows that the DEVELOPED/EMERGING and NYSE/NASDAQ variables are 
significant and the variable FIRMSIZE is not. 
The negative value of the coefficient of the DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable in the 
regression equation shows an inverse relationship between SOX’s effect and level of 
development of the country where the ADR issuers list their underlying shares. It 
suggests that the ADR issuers of the developed countries constitute a substantial 
proportion that increases the negative effect of SOX. That finding supports the argument 
that the ADR issuers from developed countries with strict controlling mechanisms (high 
auditing standards, required transparency in financial statements, the explicit 
responsibilities of managers) must spare more expenses for requirements that they have 
already met or at least almost met. This negatively affects the investors’ attitudes and 
decreases firm values. This result also supports the situation facing emerging countries. 
The argument is that the ADR issuers of the emerging countries where the controlling 
mechanisms are inadequate must accept the compliance cost in order to access the U.S. 
market where they can bond themselves and increase their firm values; this increase in 
benefits could outweigh the compliance costs that affect investors’ attitudes in a positive 
way. Consequently, we find that firm values increase. 
The positive value of the coefficient of the NYSE/NASDAQ shows a consistent 
relationship between SOX’s effect and the liquidity of the exchange where the foreign 
firms list the ADRs. It indicates that SOX’s effect on the price reaction of the underlying 
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shares of the ADR issuers that list the ADRs on the NYSE is positive while that of the 
ADR issuers who list on the NASDAQ receive somewhat lower positive values. This 
finding is consistent with the argument concerning the effects of the higher liquidity of 
certain exchanges. The assertion is that the price reaction of the underlying shares of 
cross-listing firms is more positive on the exchanges that have greater liquidity compared 
with those exchanges that have lesser liquidity. 
At window (0, 10), the values of the coefficient (δ) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively -0.37 and 0.00 (indicates 
significance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ variable are 
respectively 0.01 and 0.95 (indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), and those 
of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively -0.09 and 0.47 (indicates insignificance at a 
test level of 5 percent). 
The results concerning event window (0) indicate that the values of the coefficient (δ) 
and p of the DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively -0.11 and 0.33 
(indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ 
variable are respectively 0.08 and 0.55 (indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 
percent) and those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively -0.01 and 0.96 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent). 
 
At event window (0, 1), the values of the coefficient (δ) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively -0.15 and 0.19 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ variable 
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are respectively 0.02 and 0.86 (indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 percent) and 
those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively - 0.06 and 0.65 (indicates insignificance 
at a test level of 5 percent).  
Window (0, 3) results suggest that the values of the coefficient (δ) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively -0.08 and 0.47 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ variable 
are respectively 0.08 and 0.56 (indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 percent) and 
those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively -0.00 and 0.98 (indicates insignificance 
at a test level of 5 percent). 
Results for window (0, 5) show that the values of the coefficient (α) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively -0.08 and 0.47 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ variables 
are respectively 0.16 and 0.23 (indicates insignificance at a test level of 5 percent) and 
those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively 0.10 and 0.43(indicates insignificance at 
a test level of 5 percent). 
At window (-1, 1) results suggest that the values of the coefficient (δ) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable are respectively 0.59 and 0.59 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the variable NYSE/NASDAQ 
are respectively 0.19 and 0.13 (indicates insignificance at test level of 5 percent), and 
those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively - 0.20 and 0.12 (indicates insignificance 
at a test level of 5 percent). 
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At the window (-3, 3), the values of the coefficient (α) and p of the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variables are respectively 0.15 and 0.12 (indicates 
insignificance at a test level of 5 percent), while those of the NYSE/NASDAQ variable 
are respectively 0.27 and 0.02 (indicates significance at a test level of 5 percent) and 
those of the variable FIRMSIZE are respectively -0.25 and 0.04 (indicates insignificance 
at a test level of 5 percent). 
Overall, the results show that in the eight windows examined, there are four windows 
indicating certain factors having significant relationships with the CSARs. In the window 
(-10, 10), the most important window of this study, there are two factors evidencing their 
significance at the test level of 10 percent: DEVELOPED/EMERGING and 
NYSE/NASDAQ. In the window (0,10), one factor shows significance: 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING. And in the window (-3, +3), two factor shows significance: 
NYSE/NASDAQ and FIRMSIZE. 
In terms of the factors’ impacts on the CSARs, the study finds that the 
DEVELOPED/EMERGING variable shows a negative impact six out of eight times (75 
percent) while the NYSE/NASDAQ factor shows a positive impact eight out of eight 
times (100 percent) and the FIRMSIZE variable results in shows a negative impact seven 
out of eight times (88 percent).          
 
6.2. Discussion 
6.2.1. The major pattern in the observations 
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In summary, the study results in three important findings. Firstly, SOX’s effect on the 
ADR issue is not statistically significant. Secondly, foreign firms increasing firm values 
when they announce their ADR’s issuance is significant statistically. And finally, the 
effects of the two factors (country, whether developed or emerging, and exchange [NYSE 
or NASDAQ]) on SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers’ firm values after SOX was enacted 
is statistically significant, while the effect of the third factor (firm size) on the ADR 
issuers’ firm values after SOX’s passage is not statistically significant. 
These three discoveries are found when the study uses the largest event window (the 21-
day event window) in carrying out the analysis. However, if the study uses smaller event 
windows, these latter results are not always consistent with those for the 21-day event 
window.  This finding is confirmed for three major analyses carried out in this study: (1) 
using the CSARs in the mean different analysis for the cumulative windows, (2) using the 
SARs in the mean difference analysis for each date in the event window, and (3) using 
regression to analyze the effects of the factors. This inconsistency shows that SOX’s 
effect is insignificant. Several studies
166
 support this finding.   
In the case of using the CSARs in analyzing the mean differences in the two periods, the 
result of using the 21-day event window shows that SOX’s effect on the ADR issue is 
insignificant. On the other hand, the foreign firms’ gain in their firm values when they 
announce the ADR’s issuance after SOX’s enactment is significant. However, when the 
study uses smaller event windows, the results are neither consistent among themselves 
nor when compared with the 21-day event window’s result. When considering these 
results, we note that the CSARs’ mean difference between the two periods and SOX’s 
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effect on the ADR issue is insignificant and the foreign firms gain firm value when they 
announce their ADR’s issuance. This finding differs from other findings 167  that the 
SOX’s effect on the ADR issue is significant and that the foreign firms lose firm value 
when they announce their ADR’s issuance. 
When using the SARs in the analysis of the mean differences in the two periods, the 
results from each date of the 21-day event window show almost the same finding as those 
in the CSARs’ case. Using the SARs, the study also finds that the number of event 
windows with results that support the significance of SOX’s effect on the ADR issue is 
slightly less than those that indicate that SOX’s effect on the ADR issue is insignificant. 
The SARs also show that the number of event windows with a positive mean for the 
SARs in the post-SOX period is slightly higher than those with a negative mean for the 
SARs in that same period. 
When using regression analysis to determine the effects of the factors on SOX’s effect on 
the ADR issue, the study also arrives at the same findings as those for the CSARs’ case 
and for the SARs’ case. The findings of the regression analysis show that when the study 
uses the 21-day event window, the result indicates two factors (country and exchange) 
that significantly impact SOX’s effect. However, when the study uses smaller event 
windows, their results are not consistent with the result from the 21-day event window; 
they show that the effect of the two factors on SOX’s effect on the ADR issue is 
insignificant.  
                                                          
167
 Berger et al. (2006) 
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The reason that there is an inconsistency between the result of the 21-day event window 
and the results of the smaller event windows may be due to the fact that SOX’s effect is 
not negative enough or positive enough to cause a significant negative impact or a 
significant positive impact on the firm values of the ADR issuers.  
If SOX has a strong negative impact on the ADR issue, it can cause a significant negative 
impact on the results for almost all of the event windows in both the CSAR analysis and 
the SAR analysis. However, the study does not reveal this phenomenon. The study still 
finds that after SOX’s issuance, the foreign firms significantly increase their firm values 
when they announce the issue of their ADRs. Furthermore, if SOX has a strong positive 
impact, it can help increase the significant positive impact on the results for almost all of 
the event windows in both the CSAR analysis and the SAR analysis. Once again, the 
study does not reveal this phenomenon. Therefore, this study concludes that SOX’s effect 
on the firm values of the foreign firms that announce their ADRs’ issuance is neither 
strongly positive nor strongly negative.  
In terms of inconsistency among the factors’ effects (country, exchange, and firm size) on 
SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers’ firm values, the reason might be because SOX’s effect 
on the ADR issuers’ firm value is insignificant. Therefore, the study is not able to find 
consistency in the factors’ effect on SOX’s effect. SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers’ firm 
value is so negligible, in some small event windows, that it cannot be detected; when the 
study uses the largest event window (the 21-day event window) that cumulates all of 
SOX’s negligible effects in small event windows, there can be enough of a cumulative 
effect to reveal the significance in the factors’ effects on the firm value of the foreign 
firms. 
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6.2.2. The relationship among the results 
Even though, as the above discussion points out, the major pattern of the observations 
demonstrates that there are inconsistencies among the results of the largest event window 
(21-day event window) and the smaller event windows in each analysis of the CSARs, 
the SARs, and the regression analysis, the relationships among the results of these 
analyses is consistent. 
In the CTSAR analysis, the results show that after SOX’s issuance, the firm values of the 
foreign firms increase significantly when they announce their ADR’s issuance. The 
CSAR analysis also supports this finding. The result of the CSAR analysis reveals that 
SOX’s effect is insignificant, and half of the results of the event windows in the study 
show a positive mean for the CSARs in the post-SOX period. Most importantly, one of 
the event windows that shows a positive mean is the largest event window, which 
represents a critical result. The results of both the CTSAR analysis and the CSAR 
analysis support the argument that SOX’s effect is insignificant and that the firm values 
of the foreign firms increase when they announce their ADR’s issuance. This argument is 
confirmed by the results of the SAR analysis. The results of the SARs show that over half 
of the results of the event windows in the study indicate a positive mean for the SARs in 
the post-SOX period. Overall, the major results of this study support the argument that 
SOX’s effect on the firm values of the foreign firms when they announce their ADR’s 
issuance is insignificant and that these foreign firms increase their firm value when they 
announce their ADR’s issuance.             
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These methodologies use the same data base even though they are calculated by many 
different methodologies (the CTSAR, the CSAR and SAR); this might account for the 
consistency in their results. It may also be due to the fact that the quality of study sample 
is robust enough to represent the trend of SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers’ firm value. 
 
6.2.3. The relationship between the original question and the present result  
The question initially posed in this study is whether the SOX Act has a positive or 
negative impact on the firm values of the foreign firms when they announce their ADRs’ 
issuance. Many of the studies conducted to answer this question are described in the 
literature review section; some support SOX’s positive impact, and the others support 
SOX’s negative impact.  
This study’s primary result differs from those that either support SOX’s positive impact 
or support SOX’s negative impact. This study finds that SOX’s effect is insignificant 
with regard to the firm values of the foreign firms when they announce their ADR’ 
issuance; alternatively, the study discovers that SOX’s effect is neutral with respect to the 
firm values of the foreign firms when they announce their ADR’s issuance. 
The increase of the firm values of the foreign firms found in the CTSAR analysis, the 
CSAR analysis and the SAR analysis might simply be the result of the ADR issuance. 
Many studies find that the ADRs’ issuance helps increase the firm value (these studies 
are also described in the literature review).  
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6.2.4. The significance of the present results 
The finding of SOX’s neutral effect on the firm values of the foreign firms when they 
announce their ADRs’ issuance is a useful discovery.  
SOX’s objective is to improve the corporate governance of the public firms in U.S. stock 
market; in reality, the public firms in U.S. stock markets have to comply with this act and 
improve their corporate governance. This improvement is very helpful for investors and 
U.S. stock markets; the investors will have more faith in the firms listed on U.S. stock 
markets, and the reputation of the U.S. stock markets will be enhanced. 
The SOX Act helps improve corporate governance in the firms listed on U.S. stock 
markets, restores the investors’ confidence and increases trust in U.S. stock markets. 
Remarkably, the act’s compliance costs do not cause a negative impact on firm values of 
the foreign firms when they announce their ADR’s issuance (as this study discovered, 
SOX’s effect is neutral); therefore, this act should prove beneficial for all concerned 
parties. 
More specifically, this study’s discovery of SOX’s neutral effect on the firm values of the 
foreign firms when they announce their ADRs’ issuance justifies regarding SOX as a 
successful law in terms of its effect on the ADR issuers.         
 
7. Conclusion 
By using a matching methodology and event study to find SOX’s effect on the firm 
values of the foreign firms when they announce their ADRs’ issuance, this study makes 
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some important findings: first, SOX’s effect on the firm values of the foreign firms when 
they announce their ADRs’ issuance is insignificant (table.2, table.3). This conclusion 
rejects the hypothesis 1, which states that the effect of SOX on the firm value of the ADR 
issues is significant; second, after SOX’s issuance, the firm values of the foreign firms 
increases significantly when they announce their ADRs’ issuance (table.1a, table.1b); 
third, the effect of the two factors (country and exchange) on SOX’s effect on the firm 
values of the foreign firm is significant. This conclusion rejects the two hypotheses 2 and 
3, which suppose that the factor of country does not impact significantly the effect of 
SOX and the factor of exchange does not impact significantly the effect of SOX as well; 
and fourth, the effect of the third factor (firm size) on the firm values of the foreign firms 
is insignificant. This conclusion accepts that hypothesis 4, which states that the factor of 
firm-size does not impact significantly the effect of SOX (table.4). 
Many studies
168
 have examined SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers, but their results vary. 
Some support SOX’s positive impact, but others support SOX’s negative impact. This 
study uses a matching methodology that matches the ADRs in the post-SOX period and 
those in the pre-SOX period following some matching criteria such as identical 
industries, countries (or the corporate governance) and firm sizes. The study was able to 
find eighty matching pairs following this method.  
By comparing the firm values between two groups of ADRs (one group belonging to the 
pre-SOX period, and the other belonging to the post-SOX period) of the eighty matching 
pairs, this study discovers that SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers is insignificant. The 
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study uses several approaches to analyze this question: the CTSARs, the CSARs, the 
SARs and regression analysis; all of them support this finding. 
The CTSAR approach confirms that after SOX’s issuance, the ADR issuers’ firm value 
increases significantly. This can be taken to mean that SOX does not have a significant 
negative impact on the ADR issuers in the post-SOX period. Alternatively, in the post-
SOX period, when the foreign firms announce their ADRs’ issuance, their firm values are 
likely to increase. This increase may be the result of the highly significant positive impact 
of the ADR issue, as many studies have concluded. It appears that the firm value 
increases and then remains relatively stable even though these firms issue the ADRs in 
the post-SOX period; this means SOX does not have a significantly negative impact on 
this increase.     
The CSAR approach confirms the finding of the CTSAR approach. The finding of the 
CSARs’ approach states that SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers is insignificant. In other 
words, since SOX’s effect is insignificant, the ADR issuers’ firm value increases 
significantly and then remains relatively constant even though these firms issue the ADRs 
in the post-SOX period. 
The SAR approach confirms the finding of the CSAR approach. The finding of the SAR 
approach also confirms that SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers is insignificant.  
Using the cross-sectional regression approach, the study discovers a significant effect 
from the two factors’ (country and exchange) on the ADR issuers’ firm value, but the 
firm size does not have significant impact on the ADR issuers’ firm value. The study’s 
findings support the argument that the foreign firms from developed countries where the 
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corporate governance standards are high suffer severely from SOX’s significantly 
negative impact. The reason might be because these foreign firms already have a high 
quality system of corporate governance; therefore, the investors are led to believe that 
these firms do not have to pay SOX’s compliance costs. This attitude might result in a 
reduction in the firm values of these foreign firms when they issue their ADRs. 
Regarding the finding of an exchange’s effect on the ADR issuers’ firm value, the study’s 
finding supports the argument that the ADRs listed on the NYSE are respected by 
investors since they believe that the liquidity of the NYSE is high. This attitude 
overcomes the burden of SOX’s compliance costs, and this might be responsible for the 
increase in the ADR issuers’ firm value on the NYSE. Alternatively, if the ADRs are 
listed on the NASDAQ, where the liquidity is not as high as that of the NYSE, the 
investors might worry about SOX’s compliance cost, and this attitude might reduce the 
ADR issuers’ firm value for the NASDAQ listing.    
The study divides the 21-day event windows in each of the three approaches (the CSAR, 
the SAR and regression) into a number of small event windows; the study finds some 
inconsistency among the results of these small event windows. These inconsistencies 
might be because of SOX’s insignificant effect. Since SOX’s effect is insignificant, when 
this effect is divided into many event windows, the result for each window is likely to be 
very inconsequential. Also, these results might be easily transferred from the negative 
side to the positive side or vice versa; as a consequence, these results are inconsistent. 
Therefore, the inconsistencies among the results of the small event windows support the 
finding that SOX’s effect on the ADR issuers is in fact, significant. 
The findings of this study have important implications for researchers and policy makers.  
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Policy makers should be able to recognize SOX’s usefulness. SOX helps improve the 
corporate governance of U.S. publically traded firms; it restores the investors’ confidence 
and bolsters the U.S. stock market’s reputation, while at the same time SOX’s 
compliance costs do not cause a significantly negative impact on the ADR issuers’ firm 
value. 
Researchers now have some new results to consider when examining this controversial 
act.  
 
Recommendation 
The study applies the matching methodology for ADRs between two periods (the post-
SOX and the pre-SOX). This technique is applicable if the corporate governance of each 
firm and country is measured and the results of this measurement are comparable.  
The matching technology could be applied to many different kinds of events to test the 
efficiency of these occurrences. Policy makers and researchers also might use the results 
of the studies that employ the matching technique to examine efficiency of various policy 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
106 
 
References 
Alexander, G., C. Eun and S. Janakiramanan, 1987. Asset pricing and dual listing on 
foreign capital markets: A note. Journal of Finance, 42 (1): 151-158.   
Ashbaugh, H., Collins, D. W. and Lafond, R., 2006. The effects of corporate governance 
on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(1): 203-243. 
Asthana S., Balsam S. and Kim S. The effect of Enron, Andersen, and Sarbanes-Oxley on 
the market for audit services. Working Paper, Temple University 2004. 
BNY Mellon. The depositary receipt market. 2010 yearbook.   
Baker, H.K., Nofsinger, J.R., Weaver, D.G., 2002. International cross-listing and 
visibility. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37: 495–521. 
Berger P.G., Feng L., and Wong M.H.F. The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listed 
companies. Working Paper, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business 2006. 
Block S.B., 2004. The latest movement to going private: An empirical study. Journal of 
Applied Finance, 14(1):36-44. 
Brown, S., and J. Warner, 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8(3): 205-258. 
Brown, S. and J.Warner, 1985. Using stock returns: the case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14(1): 3-31. 
Butler H.N. and Ribstein L.E., 2006. The Sarbanes-Oxley debacle: What we’ve learned; 
how to fix it. AEI Press: Washington, DC. 
Bushee, B. J., and C. Leuz. 2005. Economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation: 
Evidence from the OTC bulletin board. Forthcoming, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 39(2). 
CFO Magazine (2003). 
Carney, William, 2007. “The irony of going private”. Emory Law Journal, 55(1): 141-
160. 
Cantale, S., 1996. The Choice of a Foreign Market as a Signal. Working Paper, INSEA 
Chhaochharia, V. and Y. Grinstein, 2007. Corporate governance and firm value: The 
impact of the 2002 governance rules. Journal of Finance, 62(4): 1789–1825. 
Chung, H., 2006. Investor protection and the liquidity of cross-listed securities: Evidence 
from. the ADR market. Journal of Banking and Finance 30: 1485-1505. 
 
   
107 
 
Cindy R. Alexander, Scott W. Bauguess, Gennaro Bernile, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, and 
Jennifer Marietta-Westberg, 2010. The economic effects of SOX section 404 compliance: 
a corporate insider perspective. Working paper, SEC. 
Coffee Jr. J., 1999. The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in 
corporate governance and its implications. Northwestern Law Review, 93(3): 641-707. 
Cornerstone Research, 2007. Securities class action case filings: 2007 Med-year 
assessment. Available at www.cornerstone.com, securities.cornerstone.com. 
Chuhan, P., 1992. Sources of portfolio investment in emerging markets. Unpublished 
working paper.World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Darius P. Miller, 1999. The market reaction to international cross listings: evidence from 
Depositary Receipts. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(1): 103-123. 
Depositary basic & benefits. Webpage of BNY Mellon 
 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, K. and Stulz, R., 2004a. Why are foreign firms listed in the U. S. 
worth more? Journal of Financial Economics, 71(2): 205-238.   
Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi and Ren´e M. Stulz, 2008a. Has New York become less 
competitive than London in global markets? Evaluating foreign listing choices over time. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 91(3): 253-277. 
Doukas, J. and Switzer, L.N., 2000. Common stock returns and international listing 
announcements: Conditional tests of the mild segmentation hypothesis. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 24(3): 471-501. 
Duarte, J., K. Kong, L. A. Young and S. Siegel. Foreign listings, U.S. equity markets, and 
the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Working paper, University of Washington, 2007. 
Durney, A. and Kim, E. H., 2005. To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal 
environment, and valuation. Journal of Finance, 60(3): 1461-1493.  
Dyckman, T., D. Philbrick and J. Stephan. Evidence on measuring excess returns. 
Working paper, Cornell University, 1982. 
Eldridge S.W. and Kealey B.T. SOX costs: Auditor attestation under Section 404. 
Working Paper, University of Nebraska, 2005. 
Engel, Ellen, Rachel M. Hayes, and Xue Wang, 2006. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
firms’ going private decision”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44(2): 116-145. 
Errunza, V. and Losq, E., 1985. International asset pricing under mild segmentation: 
Theory and test. Journal of Finance, 40(1): 105-124. 
Eun, C. and S. Janakiramanan, 1986. A model of international asset pricing with a 
constraint on the foreign equity ownership, Journal of Finance, 41(4), 1015-124. 
 
   
108 
 
Fanto, J. A., and R. S. Karmel, 1997. A report on the attitudes of foreign companies 
regarding a US listing. Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance,  3(1): 51-83.   
Financial Executives International (2005). 
Foerster, S.R. and Karolyi, G.A., 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor 
recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the U.S. Journal of 
Finance 54(3): 981-1013. 
Fuerst, O., 1998. A Theoretical Analysis of the Investor Protection Regulations 
Argument for Global Listing of Stocks. Unpublished working paper, Yale University. 
Governance Metrics International (2005). 
Halling, M., Pagano, M., Randl, O. and Zechner, J., 2008. Where is the market? Evidence 
from cross-listings. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2): 725-761. 
Hartman, Thomas, 2007. “The cost of being public in the era of Sarbanes-Oxley, Foley & 
Larder, LLP, August 2. 
Harold Schimkat. 1992. The SEC's proposed regulations of foreign securities issued in 
the United States. Fordham Law Review, 60(6). 
Hochberg, Y. V.; P. Sapienza; and A. Vissing-Jørgensen, 2009. “A Lobbying Approach 
to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.” Journal of Accounting Research, 47.  
Hostak, P., E. Karaoglu, T. Lys and Y. Yang. An examination of the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets for foreign firms. 
Working paper, Northwestern University, 2007. 
JPMorgan Depositary Receipt Guide. 
Jain, P. K., and Z. Rezaee. 2006. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and security market 
behavior: Early evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research (Autumn), 23(3). 
Kamar E., Karaca-Mandic P. and Talley E. Going-private decisions and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: A cross-country analysis. Working paper, University of Southern 
California School of Law, 2005. 
Karolyi, G.A., 1998. Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence and 
its managerial implications. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 7(1): 1-60. 
Karolyi, G. A., 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world: 
Challenging conventional wisdom. Review of Finance, 10(1): 99-152. 
Karolyi, G. A., 2009. Discussion of a lobbying approach to evaluating the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2): 519-538.  
Kate Litvak, 2007a. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on non-U.S. companies cross 
list in the U.S. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3): 195-228.   
 
   
109 
 
Kate Litvak, 2007b. Sarbanes-Oxley and the cross listing premium. Michigan Law 
Review, 105(8):1857-1883. 
Koehn, J., and Del Vecchio, S. 2004. Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. CPA 
Journal, 74(2): 36-40. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal determinants of 
external finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999. Corporate 
ownership around the World. Journal of Finance, 54: 471-518. 
Lai, K.W. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and auditor independence: Preliminary evidence from 
audit opinion and discretionary accruals. Working paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2003. 
Lang, M., Lins, K., Miller, D., 2003a. ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: does cross listing in 
the United States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value? 
Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (2): 317–345. 
Lang, M., Raedy, J., Yetman, M., 2003b. How representative are firms that are 
crosslisted in the United States? An analysis of accounting quality. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41(2): 363–386. 
Lau, S., Diltz, D. and Apilado, V., 1994. Valuation effects of international stock 
exchange listings. Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(4), 743-755. 
Lee, I., 1991. The impact of overseas listings on shareholder wealth: The case of the 
London and Toronto Stock Exchanges. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
18(4): 583-592. 
Leuz C., Triantis A.J. and Wang T.Y. Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic 
consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations. Working Paper, the Wharton School, 
2006. 
Li, Xi. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and cross-listed foreign private issuers. Working paper, 
University of Miami, 2007. 
Li H, Pincus M. and Rego S.O., 2008. Market reaction to events surrounding the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Law and Economics, 51(1): 111-34. 
Lins, K., Strickland, D., and Zenner, M., 2005. Do non-U.S. firms issue equity on U.S. 
exchanges to relax capital constraints? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
40: 109-133. 
MacKinlay A. C., 1997. Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(1): 13-39.   
McWilliam, A. and D. Siegel. 1997. Event study in management research: theoretical and 
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journey, 40(3): 626-657. 
 
   
110 
 
Mark, J. Roe, 1991. A political theory of American corporate finance. Columbia Law 
Review. 91(1): 10 – 67.  
Marosi, Andras and Nadia Massoud, 2007. Why do firms go dark? Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 42: 421–442. 
Merton, R., 1987. Presidential address: a simple model of capital market equilibrium with 
incomplete information. Journal of Finance, 42: 483-510. 
Michael Seiler, 2003. Performing financial studies: A methodological cookbook. Prentice 
Hall; 1 edition February 3, ISBN-10: 0130479810, ISBN-13: 978-0130479815. 
Mitchell L.E., 2003. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the reinvention of corporate 
governance? Villanova Law Review 48(4): 1189-1216. 
Mitton, T. 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East 
Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2): 215-241. 
Moel, A., 2001. The role of ADRs in the development of emerging markets. Economic, 
2: 209–257. 
Noronha, G., Sarin, A., and Saudagaran, S., 1996. Testing for liquidity effects of 
international duallistings using intraday data. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20(6): 
965-983. 
Peter Roosenboom, Mathijs A. and Van Gijk, 2009. The market reaction to cross-listings: 
Does the destination market matter? Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(10): 1898-1909.   
Piotroski, J. D., and S. Srinivasan, 2008. Regulation and bonding: the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the flow of international listings.  Journal of Accounting Research, 46(2): 383–
425. 
Prentice, Robert and David Spence, 2007. Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate 
Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom? Georgetown Law Journal, 95: 1843-
1944. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers', "30% of Fast-Growth Private Companies Applying 
Sarbanes-Oxley Principles," Trendsetter Barometer, June 21, 2005. 
R. C. Stapleton and M. G. Subrahmanyam, 1983. The Market Model and Capital Asset 
Pricing Theory: A note, Blackwell Publishing for the American Finance Association, 
38(5): 1637-1642.  
Reese, W., Weisbach, M., 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-
listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 66: 65–104. 
Rezaee, Z. and Jain, P.K., 2006. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and security market 
behavior: Early evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(3): 629-54. 
 
   
111 
 
Ribstein, Larry. Sarbanes-Oxley after three years, Working Paper, University of Illinois, 
2005. 
Romano R., 2005. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate 
governance. Yale Law Journal, 114(7): 1521-1604. 
Roosenboom, Peter, and Mathijs A. van Dijk, 2009. The Market Reaction to Cross-
Listings: Does the Destination Market Matter? Journal of Banking and Finance, 33: 
1898-1908 
SEC. 2002. A guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Salva, C., 2003. Foreign listings, corporate governance, and equity valuations. Journal of 
Economics and Business, 55(5-6), 463-485. 
Shadab, Houman B., 2007. Innovation and corporate governance: the impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley. Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Working Paper. 
Solomon, Deborah and Bryan-Low, Cassell, 2004. Companies complain about cost of 
corporate-governance rule. The Wall Street Journal. 
Silva, A.C., and Chávez, G.A., 2008. Cross-listing and liquidity in emerging market 
stocks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(3), 420-433. 
Smith, K., and Sofianos, G., 1996. The distribution of global trading in NYSE-listed non-
U.S.stocks. NYSE working paper, 1999. 
Smith GP. A Look at the Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Cross-Listed Firms. Working 
paper, Arizona State University West, 2007. 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977. Market Imperfection, Capital Market Equilibrium 
and Corporation Finance. Journal of Finance, 32: 307-319. 
Stulz, R., 1999. Globalization, corporate ﬁnance, and the cost of capital. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 12: 8–25 
Thomas Clarke, 2007. International Corporate Governance: A comparative approach, 
Routledge. ISBN-10: 0-415-32309-6, ISBN-13:978-0-415-32309-3. 
Tinic, S. and R. West, 1974. Marketability of common stocks in Canada and the USA: A 
comparison of agent versus dealer dominated markets. Journal of Finance, 29(3): 729-
746.     
Varela, O. and Lee, S.H., 1993. International listings, the security market line and capital 
markets integration: The case of US listings on the London Stock Exchange. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 20(6): 843-863. 
Wurgler, J., 2000. Financial markets and the allocation of capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics ,58. 
 
   
112 
 
Zhang, I.X., 2005. Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 44(1-2): 74-115. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
113 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1a Statistical test on the CTSARs in the pre-SOX period 
The table presents the Cumulative Total Standardized Abnormal Returns (CTSARs) of 80 ADR issuing 
announcements by foreign firms over the 1994-2002 period. Cumulative Total Standardized Abnormal 
Returns (CTSARs) are computed from the market model as prediction errors. Day 0 refers to the 
announcement day of ADR issuance as reported by NexisLexis® Academic. Z-statistics is used to test for 
the statistical significance of mean [CTSARs]. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
Event 
date 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Event 
date 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
 
(-10,-10) 
(-10,-9) 
(-10,-8) 
(-10,-7) 
(-10,-6) 
(-10,-5) 
(-10,-4) 
(-10,-3) 
(-10,-2) 
(-10,-1) 
 
10.3397 
11.2768 
18.3868 
14.5099 
7.4802 
17.9426 
26.7657 
38.7466 
40.0914 
57.0315 
 
Z-statistic 
1.1177 
0.8619 
1.1475 
0.7842 
0.3616 
0.7918 
1.0936 
1.4808 
1.4446 
1.9495 
p-value 
0.2636 
0.3886 
0.2511 
0.4328 
0.7176 
0.4284 
0.2741 
0.1386 
0.1485 
0.0512* 
 
(-10,0) 
(-10,1) 
(-10,2) 
(-10,3) 
(-10,4) 
(-10,5) 
(-10,6) 
(-10,7) 
(-10,8) 
(-10,9) 
(-10,10) 
 
80.64079 
77.7115 
73.1375 
62.4931 
67.5359 
62.9896 
74.4649 
86.9490 
80.6138 
83.1708 
79.7217 
Z-statistic 
2.6283 
2.4250 
2.1927 
1.8054 
1.8850 
1.7023 
1.9523 
2.2154 
1.9992 
2.0104 
1.8805 
p-value 
0.0085*** 
0.0153** 
0.0283** 
0.0709* 
0.0594* 
0.0886* 
0.0508* 
0.0267** 
0.0455** 
0.0443** 
0.0600* 
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Table 1b Statistical test on the CTSARs in the post-SOX 
The table presents the Cumulative Total Standardized Abnormal Returns (CTSARs) of 80 ADR issuing 
announcements by foreign firms over the 2002-2010 period. Cumulative Total Standardized Abnormal 
Returns (CTSARs) are computed from the market model as prediction errors. Day 0 refers to the 
announcement day of ADR issuance as reported by NexisLexis® Academic. Z-statistics is used to test for 
the statistical significance of mean [CTSARs]. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
Event 
date 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Event 
date 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
Cumulative 
TSAR 
 
(-10,-10) 
(-10,-9) 
(-10,-8) 
(-10,-7) 
(-10,-6) 
(-10,-5) 
(-10,-4) 
(-10,-3) 
(-10,-2) 
(-10,-1) 
 
13.7709 
2.0062 
4.4291 
10.8093 
6.8510 
24.5476 
11.9776 
33.5418 
37.4923 
54.8841 
 
Z-statistic 
1.4886 
0.1533 
0.2764 
0.5842 
0.3312 
1.0833 
0.4893 
1.2819 
1.3509 
1.8761 
p-value 
0.1365 
0.8781 
0.7822 
0.5590 
0.7404 
0.2786 
0.6245 
0.1998 
0.1767 
0.0606* 
 
(-10,0) 
(-10,1) 
(-10,2) 
(-10,3) 
(-10,4) 
(-10,5) 
(-10,6) 
(-10,7) 
(-10,8) 
(-10,9) 
(-10,10) 
 
44.8002 
39.3132 
42.8655 
48.4926 
67.2430 
64.7835 
75.6955 
90.4853 
79.4552 
84.4078 
87.5388 
Z-statistic 
1.4601 
1.2268 
1.2851 
1.4010 
1.8768 
1.7507 
1.9846 
2.3055 
1.9704 
2.0403 
2.0649 
p-value 
0.1442 
0.2198 
0.1987 
0.1612 
0.0605* 
0.0799* 
0.0471** 
0.0211** 
0.0487** 
0.0413** 
0.0389** 
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Table 2: The mean difference of the post-SOX’s CSARs and the pre-SOX’s CSARs/ 
the SOX’s effect 
The table represents equality tests of mean SCARs of two groups of ADR issuing announcements: the pre-
SOX period and the post-SOX period. Z-statistics [Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test] is used to test for the 
statistical significance of mean difference.*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
 
Event window Mean Result 
 
(-10,10) 
(0,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,3) 
(0,5) 
(0,10) 
(-1,1) 
(-3,3) 
Post-SOX 
0.89 
-0.11 
-0.19 
-0.10 
0.07 
0.32 
-0.20 
0.34 
Pre-SOX 
0.69 
0.25 
0.30 
0.20 
0.21 
1.71 
0.15 
-0.83 
Z-value 
-0.51 
-2.82 
-2.30 
-0.73 
-0.36 
-2.10 
-0.87 
-2.30 
P- value 
0.61 
0.01*** 
0.02** 
0.46 
0.72 
0.04** 
0.38 
0.02 
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Table 3 The mean difference of the post-SOX’s SARs and the pre-SOX’s SARs in 
each date of the event window/the SOX’s effect. 
The table represents equality tests of mean SCARs of two groups of ADR issuing announcements: the pre-
SOX period and the post-SOX period. Z-statistics [Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test] is used to test for the 
statistical significance of mean difference.*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
 
Event 
Date 
Mean Results Event 
Date 
Mean Results 
 
 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
Post-
SOX 
0.15 
-0.11 
0.03 
0.09 
-0.04 
0.20 
-0.18 
0.17 
0.09 
0.17 
Pre-
SOX 
0.02 
-0.27 
0.13 
-1.04 
0.40 
0.01 
0.31 
-0.35 
-0.16 
-0.24 
Z-
value 
-1.60 
-1.1 
-1.11 
-3.86 
-1.80 
-1.14 
-3.04 
-2.57 
-1.53 
-2.29 
P-value 
 
0.11 
0.27 
0.27 
0.00*** 
0.07* 
0.25 
0.00*** 
0.01*** 
0.13 
0.02** 
 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Post-
SOX 
-0.11 
-0.08 
0.06 
0.03 
0.19 
-0.02 
0.13 
0.17 
-0.15 
0.05 
0.06 
Pre-
SOX 
1.14 
0.25 
0.05 
-0.52 
0.41 
-0.59 
0.61 
1.22 
0.01 
0.00 
0.29 
Z-
value 
-1.61 
-1.79 
-0.28 
-2.68 
-1.27 
-2.76 
-2.98 
-3.06 
-1.01 
-0.18 
-1.30 
P-value 
 
0.09* 
0.07* 
0.78 
0.01*** 
0.21 
0.01*** 
0.00*** 
0.00*** 
0.31 
0.86 
0.19 
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Table 4 The results of the cross-sectional regression 
The table presents results of regression. Dependent variable in this analysis is the difference between the 
Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Returns (CSARs) in the post-SOX period and the CSARs in the pre-
SOX period. The independent variables used in this study are the dummy variables. There are three dummy 
variables: DEVELOPED/EMERGING, NYSE/NASDAQ, and FIRMSIZE. The value 0 is applied to the 
firms from emerging market countries, firms that list their ADR on NASDAQ and small firms (with market 
capitalization less than $75 million); the value 1 is applied to the firms from developed countries, firms that 
list their ADR on NYSE and large firms (with market capitalization larger that $75 million). *, **, *** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) 
are shown in boldface 
 
Event window DEVELOPED/EMERGING NYSE/NASDAQ FIRMSIZE 
 
(-10,10) 
(0,10) 
(0,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,3) 
(0,5) 
(-1,1) 
(-3,3) 
α-value 
-0.21 
-0.37 
-0.11 
-0.15 
-0.08 
-0.08 
0.59 
0.15 
P-value 
0.06* 
0.00*** 
0.33 
0.19 
0.48 
0.47 
0.59 
0.12 
β-value 
0.21 
0.01 
0.08 
0.02 
0.08 
0.16 
0.19 
0.27 
P-value 
0.10* 
0.95 
0.55 
0.86 
0.56 
0.23 
0.13 
0.02** 
δ-value 
-0.23 
-0.09 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.25 
P-value 
0.86 
0.47 
0.96 
0.65 
0.98 
0.43 
0.12 
0.04** 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
This is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test used to compare two related samples 
or repeated measurements in a single sample to determine whether their population 
means differ. 
This method is used instead of the paired Student’s t test when the sample does not fulfill 
the assumption of a normal distribution or the data is measured on an ordinal scale. 
Wilcoxon    statistic is defined as: 
   = 
|  
 (    
 
|
    
√ (    (     
  
   
where: 
n = the sample CSARs 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test Z-value is measured by: 
Z = W / std.dev.(W) 
where: 
W = the sum of the products of the signs and ranks of the absolute values of the CSARs 
Std.dev.(W) = calculated using the formula n(n+1)(2n+1)/6 
Z   N (0,1) the standard normal distribution 
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Table 5 list of the ADRs used in the pre-SOX period 
Financials in: USD (mil) 
 Symbol Industry Country Average 
sales 
Average 
assets 
Average 
debt to 
asset 
ratio 
1 ABB Industrial Engineer. Switzerland 20,332 26,403 0.21 
2 ASX Tech.Hardware&Equip. Taiwan 1,951 3,725 0.37 
3 ATE Tech.Hardware&Equip. Japan 1,765 2,880 0.05 
4 AEG Life Insurance Netherlands 23,600 338,200 0.02 
5 PVD Financial Services Chile 195 438 0.09 
6 ALU Tech.Hardware&Equip. France 14,368 32,454 0.22 
7 AU Mining  South 
Africa 
2,334 6,841 0.21 
8 AZN Pharma. & Biotech. United 
Kingdom 
21,746 25,112 0.04 
9 BBVA Banks Spain 18,120 421,804 0.04 
11 CIB Banks Colombia 582 9,230 0.16 
12 IRE Banks Ireland 5,495 168,389 0.23 
13 BP Oil & Gas Producers United 
Kingdom 
209,176 190,152 0.12 
14 BRFS Food Producers Brazil 1,957 1,316 0.46 
15 CUK Travel & Leisure United 
Kingdom 
8,456 22,678 0.28 
16 CX Construct.&Materials Mexico 11,860 22,539 0.32 
17 CGV OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist France 991 1,540 0.26 
18 CBD Food &Drug Retailers Brazil NA 3,993 0.25 
19 CIG Electricity Brazil 3,455 6,958 0.27 
20 SID Indust.Metals&Mining Brazil 3,687 8,703 0.38 
21 CS Banks Switzerland 26,402 900,445 0.29 
22 DB Banks Germany 44,933 1,242,20
2 
0.34 
23 DEO Beverages United 
Kingdom 
1,387 25,903 0.38 
24 RDY Pharma. & Biotech. India 433 693 0.13 
25 ERJ Aerospace & Defense Brazil 2,683 5,569 0.21 
26 GGB Indust.Metals&Mining Brazil 8,433 8,043 0.39 
27 GFI Mining South 
Africa 
2,023 4,394 0.07 
28 GMK Food Producers Mexico 2,397 2,434 0.27 
29 HMY Mining South 
Africa 
1,073 3,622 0.13 
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30 HDB Banks India 468 13,095 0.08 
31 HBC Banks United 
Kingdom 
40,128 1,287,10
4 
0.17 
32 IBN Banks India 1,349 35,638 0.29 
33 ING Life Insurance Netherlands 53,130 1,181,80
7 
0.18 
34 IRS Real Estate Inv&Serv Argentina 110 716 0.29 
35 JHX Construct.&Materials Australia 1,011 1,065 0.22 
36 KT Fixed Line Telecom. Korea 15,386 24,394 0.4 
37 LYG Banks United 
Kingdom 
1,540 521,608 0.09 
38 MTE Fixed Line Telecom. India 1,276 4,560 0.03 
40 NBG Banks Greece 1,623 74,159 0.08 
41 NGG Gas,H2O&Multiutility United 
Kingdom 
15,128 47,017 0.55 
42 NJ Electron&ElectricEq Japan 4,002 3,335 0.21 
43 NTT Fixed Line Telecom. Japan 85,345 169,965 0.31 
44 NOK Tech.Hardware&Equip. Finland 38,430 28,354 0.02 
45 NMR Financial Services Japan 11,999 277,527 0.14 
46 NVS Pharma. & Biotech. Switzerland 25,888 51,463 0.13 
47 IX Financial Services Japan 5,801 54,024 0.65 
48 PSO Media United 
Kingdom 
6,760 12,576 0.27 
49 PKX Indust.Metals&Mining Korea 20,013 23,505 0.18 
50 PUK Life Insurance United 
Kingdom 
135,471 331,929 0.02 
51 RBS PR F Banks United 
Kingdom 
15,128 1,129,00
9 
0.03 
53 SPP Forestry&Paper South 
Africa 
4,543 5,620 0.37 
54 SSL Oil & Gas Producers South 
Africa 
9,152 11,030 0.21 
55 SI Gerneral Industrials Germany 83,213 76,213 0.12 
56 SKM Mobile Telecom Korea 9,343 14,343 0.26 
57 SNN HealthCareEquip.&Ser United 
Kingdom 
2,351 2,893 0.15 
58 TSM Tech.Hardware&Equip. Taiwan 7,433 13,968 0.1 
59 TCL Fixed Line Telecom. India 785 1,783 0.06 
60 TEF Fixed Line Telecom. Spain 42,235 92,276 0.45 
61 TM Automobile & Parts Japan 151,928 20,059 0.34 
62 UBS Banks Switzerland 7,438 1,263,80
8 
0.51 
63 VALE-P Indust.Metals&Mining Brazil NA 23,772 0.35 
64 VE Gas,H2O&Multiutility France 31,092 38,966 0.44 
65 WIT Software&ComputerSvc India NA 1,861 0.02 
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66 AUO Tech.Hardware&Equip. Taiwan 5,233 8,687 0.28 
67 ITUB Banks Brazil 4,734 24,325 0.25 
68 DCM Mobile Telecom Japan 41,721 53,675 0.18 
69 SBS Gas,H2O&Multiutility Brazil 1,933 5,315 0.41 
70 TSU Mobile Telecom Brazil 760 2,189 0.07 
71 APSA Real Estate Inv&Serv Argentina 77 392 0.2 
72 ASMI Tech.Hardware&Equip. Netherlands 821 958 0.3 
73 ASML Tech.Hardware&Equip. Netherlands 2,857 4,266 0.24 
74 CTEL Fixed Line Telecom. Hong Kong 151 230 0.2 
75 CRESY Argentina Food 
Producers 
28 211 0.17 
77 EDAP HealthCareEquip.&Ser France 23 39 0.08 
78 FORTY Software&ComputerSvc Israel 167 622 0.33 
79 INFY Software&ComputerSvc India 1,589 1,734 0 
80 NVGN Pharma. & Biotech. Australia 10 42 0.03 
81 SPIL Tech.Hardware&Equip. Taiwan 1,433 1,853 0.28 
83 WACLY Personal Goods Japan 1,435 1,971 0.04 
84 GOLD Mining South 
Africa 
148 328 0.16 
85 TRMD  IndustrialTransport. Denmark 433 1,296 0.41 
86 WBK Banks Australia 8,567 171,607 0.23 
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Table 6 list of the ADRs used in the post-SOX period 
Financials in: USD (mil) 
 Symbol Industry Country Average 
sales 
Average 
assets 
Average 
debt to 
asset 
ratio 
1 BMA Banks Argentina 370 5,537 0.02 
2 BUD Beverages Belgium 22,460 67,484 0.34 
3 CHT Fixed Line Telecom. Taiwan 5,957 14,155 0 
4 CIG/C Electricity Brazil 6,625 12,150 0.31 
5 BCA Banks Chile 660 9,218 0.12 
6 CPL Electricity Brazil 5,899 7,755 0.4 
7 FMS HealthCareEquip.&Ser Germany 8,655 11,804 0.36 
8 FMS PR HealthCareEquip.&Ser Germany 8,655 11,804 0.36 
9 SAB Food &Drug Retailers Mexico 2,320 1,046 0.05 
10 IHG Travel & Leisure United 
Kingdom 
2,258 4,023 0.33 
12 MFG Travel & Leisure Japan 11,463 1,394,52
5 
0.32 
13 NBG PR 
A 
Banks Greece 5,133 121,585 0.05 
14 PAM Electricity Argentina 622 1,686 0.11 
15 PTI Software&ComputerSvc India 385 901 0.23 
16 PBR Oil & Gas Producers Brazil 104,309 126,689 0.23 
17 PBR/A Oil & Gas Producers Brazil 104,309 126,689 0.23 
18 ENL Media Netherland
s 
4,512 1,827 0.01 
19  RUK Media United 
Kingdom 
4,877 1,879 0 
20 RBS Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
21 RBS PR 
L 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
22 RBS PR 
M. 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
23 RBS PR 
N 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
24 RBS PR 
P 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
25  RBS PR 
Q 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
26 RBS PR 
R 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
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27 RBS PR 
S 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
28 RBS PR 
T 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
29 RDS.A Oil & Gas Producers Netherland
s 
364,110 259,768 0.08 
30 RDS.B Oil & Gas Producers Netherland
s 
364,110 259,768 0.08 
31 SNY Pharma. & Biotech. France 37,937 105,089 0.1 
32 SAP Software&ComputerSvc Germany 13,580 15,333 0.05 
33 SHG Banks Korea 9,435 203,147 0.27 
34 SLT Indust.Metals&Mining India 5,132 8,251 0.19 
35 TAM Travel & Leisure Brazil 3,683 4,578 0.41 
36 NZT Fixed Line Telecom. New 
Zealand 
3,540 5,045 0.44 
37  TI Fixed Line Telecom. Italy 39,739 120,373 0.51 
38  TS Indust.Metals&Mining Luxembour
g 
8,789 12,625 0.2 
39  WF Banks Korea 9,632 226,626 0.24 
40 GENE Pharma. & Biotech. Australia 8 24 0.02 
41 PRAN Pharma. & Biotech. Australia 0.48 9 0.04 
42 RBSPRU Banks United 
Kingdom 
49,434 2,579,20
8 
0.05 
43  AV Nonlife Insurance United 
Kingdom 
56,623 550,260 0.04 
44 BSBR Banks Brazil 7,800 88,511 0.07 
45 STD Banks Spain 22,731 748,025 0.08 
46 BCS Banks United 
Kingdom 
34,762 2,231,87
4 
0.49 
47 BCS PR. Banks United 
Kingdom 
34,762 2,231,87
4 
0.49 
48 BCS PR 
A 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
34,762 2,231,87
4 
0.49 
49 BCS PR 
C 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
34,762 2,231,87
4 
0.49 
50 BCS PR 
D 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
34,762 2,231,87
4 
0.49 
52 ESV OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist United 
Kingdom 
1,739 4,232 0.08 
54 GFA HouseGoods&homeCons
t 
Brazil 733 1,894 0.29 
56 TV Media Mexico 3,739 8,584 0.29 
57 HBC PR 
A 
Banks United 
Kingdom 
76,345 2,121,78
2 
0.22 
58 KB Banks Korea NA NA NA 
59 KNM Leisure Good Japan 2,564 2,850 0.18 
60 LPL Tech.Hardware&Equip. Korea 13,376 14,695 0.24 
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61 LUX Personal Goods Italy 6,499 8,769 0.38 
62 RIO Mining United 
Kingdom 
33,144 70,448 0.28 
63 SMS Support Services Australia 4,458 2,305 0.11 
64 TCH Broadcasting & 
Entertainment 
France 6,320 9,004 0.4 
65 UL Food Producers United 
Kingdom 
53,435 50,673 0.28 
67 UMC Tech.Hardware&Equip. Taiwan 3,125 9,121 0.1 
68  LOGI Tech.Hardware&Equip. Switzerlan
d 
2,081 1,386 0 
69  OIIM Tech.Hardware&Equip. Hong Kong 102 199 0.22 
70 PTNR Mobile Telecom Israel 1,439 1,255 0.47 
71 BTM.C Mobile Telecom Brazil 657 1,743 0.25 
72 BTM Mobile Telecom Brazil 657 1,743 0.25 
73  EBR Electricity Brazil 12,443 63,121 0.17 
74 CCH Beverages Greece 8,228 8,903 0.35 
75  CRH Construct.&Materials Ireland 24,982 26,103 0.32 
76 MT Indust.Metals&Mining Luxembour
g 
74,036 82,691 0.23 
77  BBD Banks Brazil 13,130 176,231 0.2 
78 BBL Mining United 
Kingdom 
44,435 14,720 0.21 
79  BHP Mining United 
Kingdom 
44,595 61,308 0.21 
80 SMFG Banks Japan 12,345 1,005,92
3 
0.15 
81 AIXG Mining Australia 44,595 61,308 0.21 
82  BLRX Pharma. & Biotech. Israel NA 26 0 
83 CSRE Engineering Consultants United 
Kingdom 
343 435 0.19 
84 GRFS HealthCareEquip.&Ser Spain 977 1,513 0.4 
85 SHPGY Pharma. & Biotech.  United 
Kingdom 
2,350 4,783 0.16 
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